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PATRIOTISM

THE catch-phrases used by the publicists responsible for our war propaganda on the home front provide rather a distressing commentary on the spirit that animates, or is thought to animate, the man in the street today. During the last war our high purpose was supported in the main by the patriotic appeal: "Your King and Country Need You." Nowadays, patriotism as a motive for self-sacrifice seems to be losing ground: it has the air of being slightly out of fashion, if not positively suspect of jingoism.¹ We are called upon instead to fight for a nebulous ideal of democracy which no one can define; for an utopian "New World" in which every crank is to have his say; for a world in which at any rate there will be no Gestapo ("It Might Happen Here"); and above all for Russia—Russia considered not so much as the home of a patriotic people heroically defending their fatherland, but as a socialist state in which the already established millennium has been sacrilegiously violated.

If this diagnosis is correct, then it is high time that we restored patriotism to its proper place in the scheme of things, and ceased either to take it for granted or to hold it in suspicion. True patriotism is a Christian virtue, as alien from jingoism as it is from quislingism, and suspect only when it is misunderstood. It has, as St. Thomas shows, a soundly theological basis. God alone, as first author of our being, alike *in fieri* and *in esse*, has an absolute claim to our devotion. We belong to Him as we belong to no one and nothing else, and therefore we owe Him a service and a homage to which no created person or thing can ever pretend. But God has chosen to make use of human instruments in the exercise of His creative and directive action, in order to communicate to us the gift of life and thereafter to foster and direct it; principal among which and prior to any other creature are the parents who begot us and the land that gave us birth. "And therefore," concludes St. Thomas, "after God, it is to parents and fatherland that man is most indebted. Consequently, just as it is the function of religion to pay cult to God, so, in a secondary degree, it is the function of *pietas* to pay cult to parents and fatherland."²

The obligations of this virtue of patriotism (*pietas in patriam*) are three-fold. In the first place, we owe to our country, in itself and in the person of the King and his ministers, the same kind of *respect* that we owe to our parents, and by the same title. Our country is God's instrument in our creation and direction, contributing unceasingly to our physical, intellec-

¹ The B.B.C. "Brains Trust" was recently asked why this war has produced no great patriotic songs. No answer was forthcoming.

² *Summa Theol.*, IIa, IIae, qu. CI, a. 1.

tual, moral, social, and—in some measure—even to our religious development, not only by her present services, but by her centuries of tradition. The King and his ministers are God's representatives. Their laws may not be perfect, but they ensure at least that minimum of social order which is necessary to our temporal welfare. Their private lives may be open to question: in individual instances they may deserve the name of "rascally politicians, unscrupulous place-seekers", etc.; but as long as they remain in office they are depositaries of divine authority and continue as such to claim our genuine respect.

It is a claim which deserves an especial emphasis in this democratic age; for the idea is widespread that, because the King's ministers are put in office by popular vote, it is therefore from the people that they derive their power; the result being that they are regarded as mere servants of the people and are accorded as little respect as servants normally receive. It is of course a mistaken idea. In democracy and dictatorship alike, "there is no power but from God",¹ and those who hold it participate in the inalienable divine prerogative of respect and reverence.² It is relevant to recall that the Caesar whose authority our Lord required His apostles and disciples to respect was that same tyrannical and lustful Tiberius whom Tacitus later held up to the obloquy of mankind.

The second duty of patriotism is *preferential love*. "The Natural Law," says Leo XIII, "orders us to show a special love and respect to the country in which we were born, so much so that the good citizen does not hesitate to face death for it."³ On this point also there has been much confusion of thought in recent years. Partly owing to the ravages of excessive nationalism, partly owing to a well-intentioned desire to promote the universal fellowship of mankind, an idea seems to have gained ground that preferential love of one's own country is somehow at variance with the twofold evangelical law of charity. That the truth is quite the contrary should be evident both from the example of our Lord, who showed a marked predilection for the lost sheep of the House of Israel and for the guilty city of Jerusalem, and from the example of St. Paul, who wished to be an anathema from Christ for those of his brethren who were his kinsmen according to the flesh. Preferential love of one's country, far from conflicting with the primary precept of charity, derives immediately from that *amor appetitativæ summus* which we owe to God. The very excellence of God which makes Him supreme object of our love itself demands and establishes a hierarchy in our affections. If one of our motives for loving God above all creatures is that He is the source of all our good, we must logically give preference among creatures to those who most nearly participate in His beneficent work, namely our parents and country. It

¹ *Romans*, xiii, 1.

² Leo XIII insisted continually on this theme: "Not only obedience, but respect."—*Encycl. Libertas*. "Christians," he said, "surround the idea of power with religious respect, even when it resides in an unworthy mandatory."—*Encycl. Sapientiae Christianae*.

³ *Encycl. Sapientiae Christianae*, A.S.S., XXII, p. 387.

follows, therefore, that preferential love of one's country is not only perfectly compatible with the secondary precept of charity, love of one's fellow man, but is actually necessary to its proper observance. To ignore the theological order of charity—God, kinsfolk and country, fellow man—is to deprive love of one's neighbour of its theological character.¹

On the other hand, it is only by carefully observing this order of charity, by always giving first place to God and recognizing all men as our kinsfolk in Him, that we avoid the tragic excesses of State deification on the one hand and imperialist aggression on the other, to which inordinate predilection for one's country so often leads. Pius XI, by his vigorous condemnation of totalitarianism, made it clear that no motive of patriotism can ever justify the citizen in setting the State above God. He rejected as "absolutely opposed to Catholic doctrine . . . that idea of country or State which makes them their own final end, the citizen being ordered only to the State, to which everything must be referred and into which everything must be absorbed."² Again, after praising legitimate patriotism, he warned us that when "transgressing the limit of what is just and right, it grows into an immoderate love of one's nation, it becomes a source of many wrongs and injustices. Carried away by it, men forget forthwith not only that all peoples are linked by brotherly ties in one universal human family, and that other races as well have the right to live and to aspire after prosperity, but even that it is neither lawful nor expedient to separate what is useful from what is honest."³ The true patriot is aware that Christian charity "knows no frontier";⁴ that "there is not one evangelical law of charity for individuals and another for States and peoples",⁵ but that there is one law of love for all alike.

The third duty of the patriot is that of obedience to legitimate authority. The modern State is not likely to let us forget this duty, but only too often it ignores the theological principle from which alone it can derive. The totalitarian regime usurps the authority of God by making the State the be-all and end-all of the citizen. The democratic State makes the illogical pretence of demanding obedience from those who, according to its philosophy, are the source of its authority. The obedience of the true patriot, on the contrary, is neither pagan nor inconsistent. It is based on the principle that, no matter how the governing authority be established, whether the procedure be dictatorial or democratic, "there is no power but from God. . . . Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the

¹ Pius X repudiated, therefore, with indignation the "calumny" that Catholics do not love their country. Addressing a body of French pilgrims, he said: "There is indeed no more shameful outrage to your honour and your faith; for if Catholicism were the enemy of one's country, it would no longer be a divine religion. Yes, your country, whose sacred name awakens your dearest memories, and thrills every fibre of your soul, that common land in which you were cradled, and to which you are tied by bonds of blood and by that other and nobler community of affections and traditions, is worthy not only of your love, but of your predilection."—A.A.S., I, pp. 408-9.

² Allocution, A.A.S., XVIII, p. 523.

³ Encycl. *Ubi Arcano*, A.A.S., XIV, p. 682.

⁴ Benedict XV, Litt. Ap. *Diuturni*, A.A.S., XI, p. 306.

⁵ Benedict XV, Encycl. *Pacem Dei Munus*, A.A.S., XII, p. 215.

ordinance of God".¹ It follows, therefore, that we must obey the King and his ministers, even those whom we ourselves have elected, as "God's ministers",² and that every just law which they make binds us in conscience, either to do what is ordered or, if the law be purely penal, to pay the penalty in case of default. It follows equally that our obedience can never be a blind submission to the State as an end in itself, that our *cultus patriae* must always be subordinated to the *cultus Dei* from which it derives, and that, in any conflict of allegiance, "we ought to obey God rather than men".³

It is on these clear principles that Leo XIII based his constantly repeated doctrine that riots, revolts and plots against the lawfully constituted authority of the State are forbidden, even when that authority is abused. The citizen may, and indeed—if he is to fulfil his patriotic duty—must, use all legal and honest means of amending unjust laws; and if what they command is contrary to the law of God he must refuse to observe them. But as long as the government remains the legitimate authority in the State he must continue to show it all due submission.

It is likewise from these principles that Cardinal Mercier derived his well-known doctrine of the Christian patriot's attitude to an unjust invader. "This power," he wrote, in reference to the German invasion of Belgium in 1914, "is not a legitimate authority, and consequently in your inmost heart you owe it neither esteem, nor attachment, nor obedience. The sole legitimate power in Belgium is that which belongs to our King, his government and the representatives of the nation. He is for us the sole authority. He alone has a right to the affection of our hearts, to our submission. The public administrative acts of the occupier would be in themselves void of force; but the legitimate authority tacitly ratifies those which are justified by the public interest, and it is from this ratification alone that they derive all their juridical value. To the persons who rule over us by military force . . . let us show such regard as the common interest requires. Let us respect the regulations they impose on us, as long as they prejudice neither the liberty of our Christian conscience nor our patriotic dignity".⁴

One final point remains to be elucidated, a point of special practical importance in the United Kingdom, with its four distinct nationalities: what precisely is a man's *patria*, the land to which he owes the threefold duty of *pietas* described above? Is it the land of his birth, e.g. Scotland, or Ireland, or Wales, or England? Or is it the wider community, Great Britain, of which by birth or immigration he happens to be a citizen? Few theologians seem to envisage the point. Vermeersch, perhaps because his native Belgium is likewise a united kingdom, is one of those who set the question, and he inclines to the latter view. Formerly, as he points out, the term *patria* referred to a town or city rather than to a State. Nowadays,

¹ Romans xiii, 1-2.

² Ibid., 4.

³ Acts v, 29.

⁴ *Patriotisme et endurance*, Christmas, 1914; in *Dict. Theol. Cath.*, vol. XI, col. 2312.

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however, not only a town, province or State, but also "a wider federation uniting several States, can partake of the nature of *patria*. . . . Nowadays, therefore, on account of the compactness of civic union, one's own place of birth is only in a secondary sense one's *patria*".¹ Though there would seem to be sound reason behind this view, I cannot, however, find much positive support for it among the manualists. Most authors, following St. Thomas, are content simply to give *patria* its etymological significance—"the land that gave us birth", leaving the extension of the term "land" undetermined.

But whatever view we adopt, an adequate solution of the practical issue can be found in the distinction which St. Thomas draws between *pietas ad patriam* and legal justice: "*Pietas se extendit ad patriam, secundum quod est nobis quoddam essendi principium: sed iustitia legalis respicit bonum patriae, secundum quod est bonum commune.*"² Even though we hold that the country to which a man is tied by bonds of piety is essentially and exclusively the land that gave him birth, the fact remains that he also owes a debt of legal justice to the wider community of which he is a member, the State or union of States of which he is a citizen, whether by birth or by other cause.³ And this debt of legal justice comprises, with the exception of predilection, the same essential duties. It involves loyalty, respect, internal as well as external, for the legitimate authority as representing God, obedience to that authority in all lawful matters of precept, and finally tribute, including, when the common good requires it, military service.⁴

Patriotism, therefore, whatever extension we give to the term, should provide no moral problem. To take a practical example, an Irishman resident in the United Kingdom can fairly claim, whether he emanate from northern or southern Ireland, that he owes a prior affection of love and gratitude to the land of his birth; but as long as he remains a member of this community he must loyally co-operate in promoting its common welfare. There can be no real conflict between the cognate virtues of patriotism and legal justice. Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotsmen and Welshmen can, and indeed must, be, at one and the same time, patriots and loyal citizens in any part of these isles, and, for that matter, in any part of the world. Both virtues are essential if we are really to build that better world of which the visionaries dream; and, what is more important, the faithful exercise of both virtues is part of our solemn and strict duty to God.

LAWRENCE L. McREAVY.

¹ *Theol. Mor.*, II, n. 315.

² *Summa Theol.*, IIa, IIae, qu. CI, a. 3, ad. 3m.

³ "Cum autem patria quae nos genuit, semper remanet principium quoddam ortus nostri, hinc homo, etiam ille qui exul a patria vivit, debet servare pietatem erga patriam suam; dum e contra iustitiam legalem non tenetur servare ille qui jam amplius non est subditus patriae."—Prümmer, *Theol. Mor.*, II, n. 571, Friburg, 1915, p. 444.

⁴ Merkelbach, *Theol. Mor.*, II, pp. 813-14.

EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION

NINE months ago I received a visit from the local Anglican vicar. He is by way of being more than just a nodding acquaintance of mine, for this district considers itself and calls itself a "village", and everybody of any consequence knows everybody else. This is a little out of the ordinary, when we are only half-an-hour's train run from the centre of the city where most of our six thousand people work. We are, in fact, the outermost dormitory suburb of a large town, actually joined to it by houses all the way, but far enough from the heart of it to have a life of our own. So we keep our illusion of being a real village.

My visitor explained the reason for his call thus. He and the Free Church minister wished to hold a public meeting on *The Times* letter of December, 1940; and they thought that, as the Papal Peace Points are included in that letter, it would be rather peculiar if the Catholic priest were not there. Further, would we consider starting a study group to examine the import of the "Ten Points"? I replied that this was a matter which I must refer to my Bishop, and my visitor went away, suitably impressed, I hope, by the deference paid to authority. I may mention that, nine months ago, a suggestion of this kind was a little uncommon, but my Bishop gave permission for the experiment, *adhibitis debitis cautelis*, which meant in fact that I was to mind what I was doing.

We warned the community by means of a leaflet through each letter-box, and we held our public meeting, at which the Chairman of the local Council took the chair, and at which a nonconformist minister gave an excellent talk to the three hundred people on the effect that a Christian outlook must have on social matters. Then we formed our three denominational study groups. We took, as our first question, the sixth "point" of *The Times* letter: Extreme inequality in wealth and possessions should be abolished.

So far, the sequence of events was not remarkable, and has, I know, been repeated elsewhere. But we received a mild surprise to find that there was a *fourth* study group. This had no special designation, and could hardly be expected to have one, for it was composed of the "Christians-not-belonging-to-any-denomination". About twenty in number, all were of secondary school education or more, like most of the people here.

Each group began its studies at once. In a few weeks, however, the Free Church circle collapsed. Its minister became an Army Chaplain, and it was left without a leader.

Our Catholic meetings developed on normal lines, despite the fact that we had to plan our own programme. (The Sword of the Spirit did not publish its outlines of each point until later.)¹ Our most amusing and useful discussion was on the question, "Can you make a million honestly?"

¹ 13 November, 1941, and following issues.

It was at this debate that the members came out most fully with their own personal opinions.

The first note of excitement was provided by the "disorganized" Christians. They issued an invitation to the Anglican curate to explain to them the "reaction" of his Church in the question of Private Property versus Common Ownership. I knew what to expect, and, in due course, received Sir Richard Acland's pamphlet, *It Must Be Christianity*, which advocates ordinary Collectivism, with variations. The challenge was accepted, and so we held a lively debate one winter night from 7.30 to 11 p.m., at which time a number of experience-taught wives arrived to take their husbands away. That Catholics have a well-thought-out social doctrine, based on definite principles, was an enormous surprise to these people, and the thirty copies of *Quadragesimo Anno*, which I had with me, were all eagerly taken. From this meeting arose many private and personal discussions which I still carry on.

The Anglican group seems to have had an uneasy time. The members held such diverse views that agreement often went by bare majority voting, and their final report said little of importance, except on one subject. They, like the Independent Christians, had voted for Collectivism, the State ownership, eventually, of all resources in the country. As soon as we had exchanged reports, we saw that this was an important issue. I was quite prepared to participate in a three-party meeting and to explain and defend the Catholic teaching on Property, when unforeseen circumstances led to the suspension of the Anglican meetings, with little hope of their resumption.

Much to our surprise, we and the independents were the only ones left in the field, and after eying each other for a time we thought it best to retire to our own camps, to ponder over the whole affair. The experiment had lasted just eight months.

That is the bare outline of what happened. Thinking things over, I ask myself: "Has this been an unfinished experiment, or is it a completed venture? Has it been successful up to a point, or has it been a failure? If the latter, did we make some real mistake in planning, or did we fail by mere force of circumstances? Or was the whole experiment doomed to fail from the start?"

I wish I knew the correct answers. I do not, but, as a number of similar experiments are being undertaken, and in places like our own, I may be allowed some comments.

(1) On not one occasion, at any meeting that I know of, was there the slightest sign of ill-will or even of ruffled feelings. The debating might be lively, but the atmosphere never clouded over. Thankful though I am for this display of Christian tolerance, I have the idea that the ordinary rank and file of our people regarded the discussions more as of academic interest than of real practical urgency. It seemed to be the general opinion that our social difficulties would disappear painlessly, somehow or other. It

might be interesting to speculate how, but not possible to do much about them. This feeling was as widespread among Catholics as it was among others.

(2) For this reason, it is difficult to decide how much benefit was derived from the discussions. Certainly we did not learn a great deal of social science, though more, perhaps, than one might imagine. But, indirectly, our meetings had real value. Many non-Catholics made their first direct contact with the Church; many more learnt that we have something to teach, and something sensible to teach; a fair number began to take an interest in the dogma of the Church, but of these I will say a word later.

(3) It is impossible to conduct study groups of this kind without extensive reading. Besides the Catholic literature on the Social question, I had to read what was sent to me for comment. In this way I was introduced to good books and bad books, but hardly ever to dull books. In contrast to this, I was puzzled and embarrassed by finding that most of the Catholic writings I lent to people were returned half-read, though these people read through other books on social questions. To me, this was disturbing, for it was true of Catholics and non-Catholics alike: they found our books unreadable. Here are the reasons given by the people themselves. (a) We use too many words and phrases in a technical sense, without explaining sufficiently what we mean by them, v.g. Natural Law, Catholic action, contingent circumstances, hierarchical order, middle term (these examples come from two pages of a Catholic book).¹ (b) Much of our material is taken directly from sources abroad, v.g. Encyclicals; Italian, French, and Belgian publications. We put it into English-Dictionary dress, and never bother to put it into English which the ordinary person can clearly understand.² (c) Our Catholic writers have invented a fearsome style of their own, which can hardly be called easy reading, v.g. Christopher Dawson, "(the Liberal age was) at once creative and destructive, but essentially transitional and impermanent; and this instability was due to no other cause than to that very separation and dislocation of the inner and outer worlds of human experience which the thinkers of the age accepted as a normal condition of existence" (*Progress and Religion*, p. 101). From another author, "German propaganda is in fact a weapon of disintegration. It seeks, on the one hand, to divide a community by accentuating differences of opinion and clashes of interest into irreparable and fanatical conflicts of passion and belief; on the other, to encourage these conflicts by appealing to man's sub-rational being, to envy, malice, cupidity, prejudice, passion and fear" (*The Sword of the Spirit for New Members*). Such writing is not easily read at length, and soon becomes irksome to ordinary folk.

(4) Mention has been made above of those who took an interest in the dogmas of the Church. It was impossible to disregard their enquiries,

¹ Examples given by a non-Catholic doctor.

² Example (from a non-Catholic patents agent, who knows our social literature thoroughly): Fanfani's *Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism* (Sheed & Ward, 1939).

which were obviously sincere. The first query came from a man who asked if there is such a thing as moral responsibility for our actions, the forces of evil being far stronger than the powers of man to resist them. Another argued that a Christian front is impossible in England because of Original Sin! In both cases I am still answering their questions on Grace. Another incident was startling. A member of another church, a baptised Christian, called to ask what exactly the Trinity meant, as her small child was learning about it, and kept asking questions. After this, I began to question every enquirer about his own beliefs and the meaning of the words he used to express them. Not once, in many instances over six months, did I find a single non-Catholic in this locality who held more than two distinct points of doctrine in the same sense that we do. Very often the words were the same as ours, but the meaning completely different. One caller agreed that Jesus Christ was God; but it turned out that we are all Gods in some way or other, and there was nothing very special in Our Lord's divinity. After two months of this daily experience (and it was daily at this time) I became curious to know if we were especially unregenerate here. So I read and examined some thirty modern non-Catholic treatises dealing with spiritual things.¹ And very depressing it was, too. If I am to believe the evidence of these books and the testimony of the living men and women who talked with me, it seems perfectly possible to be baptised in England an adult baptised Christian, presumably in a state of Grace, who does not assent to *any* revealed truth with an act of Divine Faith. How otherwise am I to understand the position of a local clergyman who tells me he fully agrees with Davies (whose recent book is sponsored by the present Archbishop of Canterbury)?

"Revelation is never a communication of doctrine, but of person and meaning. Doctrine is the systematic appropriation by a very imperfect instrument (which is what the human mind is) of the insights of persons, an attempt to correlate them to the totality of experience. In the event, the original revelation undergoes some distortion. Bergson contended that the mind is incapable of representing experience in its actual purity. The very act of thinking is an inevitable distortion. This is certainly true of revelation."²

To a man who holds that, it seems that no revealed truth can be assented to with the firmness which an act of Divine Faith demands (cf. Denz, 1171). He can never be certain that God has said *this* and not *that*.

(5) From the above, it can be seen that I am not entirely in agreement with either Dr. Butterfield (CLERGY REVIEW, April, 1942) or with Fr. Bevenot, S.J. (June, 1942). To my mind, Dr. Butterfield goes too far in

¹ As a sample of the Archbishop of Canterbury school, *Secular Illusion or Christian Realism* (D. R. Davies, 1942); *The Two Moralities* (A. D. Lindsay, 1940); *Citizen and Churchman* (William Temple, 1941). All Eyre & Spottiswoode. Also, *Man and God and Christianity and Social Order* (William Temple).

² Some Anglican writers are as confusing as anyone else. But two blacks do not make a white.

saying "there can be no real unity, agreement, in even one point of faith between the faith of the Catholic and the belief of the heretic is set gulf. . . ." May I quote Fr. Lennerz, S.J.: "Circa haereticos bonae fidei negari nequit eos posse elicere actum fidei divinae" (*De Virtutibus Theologicis*, 1927, 285). Further, the act of Divine Faith cannot be made except in regard to a true point of revealed truth; and these can be many; a common Christian basis for co-operation in practice. But I do agree that there are cases in which there is no basis of this sort. It is here that I part company with Fr. Bevenot. He states, ". . . true Faith¹ . . . cannot be empty of content: it must contain as its object truths which God really *has* revealed and not merely things which He is thought to have revealed but has not." I may note that this "content" of Faith can never contain "things which He is thought to have revealed but has not"; it can only contain—if it is true Faith—what God *has* revealed. The alternative is either a "content" of revealed truths or no "content" at all. But why cannot it be empty of content? What of a baptised baby, captured by savages and brought up by them to adult age, without any knowledge of revealed truth? Does it lose, inculpably, the infused virtue of Faith given to it at its baptism?

(6) My purpose in (4) above was not to enter into controversy, but to show where we made a mistake in our procedure. This mistake consisted in the needless arguing over the *reasons why* we all wished for some definite social reform instead of accepting thankfully the fact that we did agree about it. For this reason, we covered only one of the "Ten Points" in eight months. Yet, at the beginning, we had stated that our object was to find out where we agreed, without regard to the many differences of doctrine between us. Such is human nature; we discovered our differences, but not our agreements.

I have set down this account, together with my comments, partly for the information of my Bishop, partly at the request of others who have been asked to undertake similar experiments, for it is a fact that many priests do not know what to expect in practice. I did not know myself. But, because of this experiment, I have learnt a great deal, and very useful knowledge it is. The discussions were also of value, indirectly especially, to many non-Catholics. I am informed this morning that the discussions may start again, and, for the sake of those outside the Church, I am very glad. What of my own people? Was any influence exercised on them by meeting non-Catholics in these social studies? As far as I can discover, there was none, either good or bad. The general attitude was, "If it does these people good and teaches them something, we have no objection to their efforts. But do not ask us to pay much attention to them or their opinions." Perhaps, on the whole, this is the safest attitude; is it the most desirable? From my point of view, it does allow me to sleep quietly at night.

"K. T. L."

¹ The infused virtue of Faith?

THE PURSUIT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE proper adjustment of the relationships between the One and the Many has been the central problem of political philosophy since the days of Plato. The individual makes claims to rights and liberties which the community at times calls on him to sacrifice for the sake of the common welfare. Must he do so? May he resist the claims of the community? How far may he be coerced? Are the interests of the One and the Many irreconcilable? How, exactly, are they related? These are questions of some immediate importance not merely because of the steady encroachment of the State on individual life at the present time, but also because one of the purposes for which the present war is being fought is the vindication of the rights of the human person against these all-pervasive claims of the State. And it will be important to have clear ideas on these relationships in our contributions to, or criticisms of, post-war plans for reconstruction.

The Catholic solution to this problem is bound up very intimately with the notion of authority in political life, and with an understanding of the end or purpose of law, that "common good", the *bonum commune*, which slips so easily from the tongue or pen, and is so hard to pin down in any given case or in a more concrete definition. There has been a great deal of false interpretation and of inaccurate commentary on the Thomist notion of the *bonum commune*, and in this country most students of mediaeval political theory have been unfortunate in learning about mediaeval teaching on this complex matter from a work which, despite its high merits in other respects, is in this matter not only inadequate but positively misleading. Yet recent critics of this work have, so it seems to me, done little to improve matters. Every university student of mediaeval political philosophy is recommended to read the English translations of parts of Otto von Gierke's monumental treatise *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, parts of which are better known in English as *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, translated with a brilliant Introduction by F. W. Maitland, and *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, equally well translated by Professor Ernest Barker. There is, besides these well-known books, an American translation of another work by Gierke on Johannes Althusius, now entitled *The Development of Political Theory*. One point emphasized in all these works is that the teaching of the Middle Ages was dominated by the idea of Unity, and of the overriding importance of the Whole in comparison with the Parts. The world is thus an organic structure made up of parts, each part in its turn being made up of lesser "partial Wholes". The Total Body has a final cause of its own, in pursuit of which it dominates the parts, just as these in their turn, being partial wholes, dominate the parts of which they are composed.¹

¹ See, for example, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, pp. 10, 21, 28. Perhaps the best short explanation of Gierke's view is in his *Development of Political Theory*, p. 71:

This "organic unity" of all groups in society was not, in Gierke's opinion, pushed by the mediaeval thinkers to such limits that the individual was completely absorbed by the group; but he maintains that these thinkers subordinated the purpose of the individual to the purpose of the group, and in that sense gave the individual a value only in so far as he formed part of and acted through the group. Thus he says in *Political Theories of the Middle Age* (p. 7):

Political Thought when it is genuinely mediaeval starts from the Whole, but ascribes an intrinsic value to every Partial Whole down to and including the Individual. If it holds out one hand to Antique Thought when it sets the Whole before the Parts, and the other hand to the Modern Theories of Natural Law when it proclaims the intrinsic and aboriginal rights of the Individual, its peculiar characteristic is that it sees the Universe as one articulated whole and every Being—whether a Joint-Being (Community) or a Single-Being—as both a Part and a Whole: a Part determined by the final cause of the Universe, and a Whole with a final cause of its own.

According to Gierke, however, mediaeval theory was never pressed to its logical conclusion. It "failed to issue in the legal idea of Personality—the single Personality of the group". In consequence the "organic" conception of society tended to disintegrate, the harmony of parts and wholes became a dualism between the State and the Individual. The idea of universal society in a single whole was lost, and in place of the hierarchic ordering of society there grew up the modern atomistic conception of states based on contract between individuals, and of society as an uneasy equilibrium between a plurality of independent states. Professor Ernest Barker seems to adopt this view. "To mediaeval thought, as to Plato," he writes, "the unity of society is an organic unity, in the sense that each member of society is an organ of the whole to which he belongs, and discharges a function at once peculiar to himself and necessary to the full life of the whole."¹

"The genuinely mediaeval system of thought was in its heights and depths imbued with the theocratic idea. Its view of the world starts with the idea that the universe is one Organism (macrocosmos) animated by one Spirit and moulded by one Law in which, by virtue of the all-pervading divinely ordained harmony, every partial unity (microcosmos) presents an image of the universal whole. . . . Whence it follows that the starting-point of all social construction is the principle of unity ('principium unitatis'), from which every plurality takes its origin, in which it finds its norm, and to which it returns. Hence the Totality of mankind, being conceived as a partial unity with a final cause of its own within the universal whole, appears as a single State founded and monarchically governed by God Himself, which must express itself equally in the two correlative Orders of the Universal Church and the Universal Empire; and every partial unity, ecclesiastical or secular, derives its own essential oneness from this primal Unity."

¹ "Unity in the Middle Ages", an essay in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, edited by F. S. Marvin, p. 110. A little further on Dr. Barker makes the extraordinary statement: "The prevalence of Realism, which marks mediaeval metaphysics down to the end of the thirteenth century, is another Platonic influence, and another impulse to unity. The Universal *is*, and is a veritable thing, in which the Particular shares, and acquires its substance by its degree of sharing. The One transcends the Many; the unity of mankind is greater than the difference between men. . . ." (p. 112). In fairness to Dr. Barker, however, it must be said that in his Introduction to *Natural Law and the Theory of Society* he subjects Gierke's theory of Group-Personality to a most penetrating criticism, and shows that the German philosopher is at fault in predicating of any group that it truly possesses an organic character. (See especially pp. xxix-xxx.)

If this is a true interpretation of mediaeval thought, then clearly the writers who propounded such a theory tended to deny or very much to depreciate the value of human personality. It is not surprising, therefore, to find such an able exponent of scholastic thought as Professor Maurice De Wulf asserting that Gierke had misunderstood his texts; that in this respect the subordination of the Part to the Whole was not a principle of mediaeval political thought, but that in fact the fundamental mediaeval principle was cast in precisely the contradictory sense. "The Principle," writes M. De Wulf, "may be briefly stated as follows: The State exists for the good of the citizen, or obversely, it is not the citizen who is for the good of the State."¹ He traces the foundations of this principle in the ethical and the metaphysical order. Society is a *naturalis necessitas* for man, for men derive advantages from living in society. It is the purpose of groups to procure these advantages to the members, and it follows that "the good of the group will not be of any other kind than that of the individuals". The metaphysical foundation comes down to bedrock with the principle that human personality alone is a genuine substantial reality. The group is not a *real* being; it is simply a group of human persons—a *multitudo hominum* which can have no real personality because there is nothing on which that personality can be based; *non habet velle nec nolle quia animi sunt*.

This criticism of Gierke has been taken up more recently by an American, Professor Ewart Lewis of Western Reserve University.² He has examined the references quoted by Gierke, and proves, conclusively I think, that Gierke had failed to grasp all the implications of the writers he had examined.

In short [writes Professor Lewis, after analysing the thought of Dante, Nicholas of Cusa and Antonius Rosellinus], on this question of the relation of the ends of groups to the ends of individuals, I have been unable to find any evidence which clearly supports Gierke's interpretation, and on the contrary, considerable evidence to support De Wulf's contention that mediaeval thinkers recognized no destiny except the destiny of individuals, assigned no purpose to the state or other social groups except the service of individual ends, and understood the "common good" as equivalent to the good of a totality of individuals.

What, then, are we to understand by the "common good"? And in what sense are we to say that the common good is to be preferred to the good of the individual? Is the scholastic teaching Benthamite and Spencerian? Is the common good nothing else but the greatest good of the greatest number, no more than the good of the totality of individuals? Is it true that the test is merely the test of quantity?³

¹ *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, pp. 222-3. The Chapter was one of a series of lectures delivered in America, and was originally published in *La Revue Neo-Scholastique de Philosophie*, Tom. XXII (1920), pp. 341-57, under the title "L'Individu et le Groupe dans la Scolastique du XIII^e Siècle."

² "Organic Tendencies in Mediaeval Political Thought" in the *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, October 1938, pp. 849-76.

³ "In no instance of the use of the term 'common good', so far as I can discover, has it any meaning other than 'the good common to the individual members'. Such a phrase

Professor d'Entrèves, in his valuable study *The Mediaeval Contribution to Political Thought*, fails to find a clear answer in St. Thomas to this question. In several places, he remarks, St. Thomas seems to say quite plainly that the common good is more important than that of the individual, and that the One may be called upon to suffer, if by this means the Many may gain. *Bonum multorum commune divinius est quam bonum unius. Unde pro bono communi reipublicae vel spirituali, vel temporali, virtuosum est quod aliquis etiam propriam vitam exponat periculo.*¹ He seems to suggest too that the comparison is not one of quality but of quantity. The end of the One and that of the Whole must not be judged by different standards, for they are substantially the same. *Oportet eundem finem esse multitudinis humanae qui est hominis unius.*² On the other hand, there is the categorical statement that the good of the city and the good of the single person are formally and specifically different. The common good is to the singular as the whole is to the part.³ Professor d'Entrèves admits that he is unable to provide a satisfying answer and suggests tentatively that in general a quantitative difference between the good of the Part and that of the Whole is all that can be established. This is very inconclusive, and it may be possible, equally tentatively, to push enquiry a little further.

It may help, first, to examine the nature of the Group, and of its unity. Every group is constituted in view of some end. It is the end or purpose which determines the nature of a society, gives it its extrinsic form, and provides its extrinsic unity, determining the direction of the society. The intrinsic unity follows, a product of that authority which arises in the society from the impulsion of the members towards a common end. Of what sort is this unity which exists in any society? It is clearly not an accidental unity such as exists in a heap of stones, nor an artificial unity such as exists in a house or a machine, nor a unity of composition such as exists in a chemical compound. Is it an organic unity, comparable to the unity of the members in a living body? Is the term "the Body Politic" an analogy, a metaphor, or the expression of a reality described univocally? St. Thomas does not, I think, use the term "body" in connexion with the building up of groups, but he shows quite clearly that the unity of the

is often used interchangeably with 'the common good'. The principle of the superiority of the common good to the good of the individual is used in two contexts: the duty of the ruler to subordinate his private ends to the good of the community, and the duty of any individual to make material sacrifices for the greater good of the whole. Both these uses are entirely consistent with an individualistic and quantitative interpretation." Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 855.

¹ *Ila, Ilae, xxxi, 3, ad 2. Cp. De Regimine Principum, Lib. I, cap. ix: "Majus autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam bonum unius, unde interdum malum unius sustinetur, si in bonum multitudinis cedat, sicut occiditur latro, ut pax multitudini detur." Also Quodlibet, I, 8: "Unaquaque pars naturali quadam inclinatione, operatur ad bonum totius, etiam cum periculo seu detrimento proprio, ut patet cum aliquis manum exponit gladio ad defensionem capitis."*

² *De Regimine Principum, I, xiv.*

³ "Bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare unius personae non differunt solum secundum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam: alia est ratio boni communis et boni singularis, sicut alia est ratio totius et partis" (*Ila, Ilae, Iviii, 7, ad 2*).

group is what he calls a unity of order, which comes into existence because of the end or the good which is being pursued. This unity does not absorb the activity of the individual members of the society, as other forms of unity do with their constituent parts, but supposes their activity co-ordinated in view of the common end. St. Thomas compares the activity of the individuals in the society, not to the activity of members in a body but to that of soldiers in an army, or to men towing a boat. There is an activity of the Parts which is also the activity of the Whole, such as the actual fighting or the towing. But this is not the whole of the activity of the Parts. There is, so to speak, a residue of activity which may be concerned with other things, such as eating and sleeping, and need not be directed to the fighting or the towing.¹

From this it stands out clearly that in the view of St. Thomas a society or a group is not an organism or an organic unity in the sense that the activity of the organs is totally consumed in the activity of the organism. Society is not an organism. It is not an individual being. It is not a substantial reality. It has no personality in the metaphysical sense. It is not even something distinct from its members. It is simply the members themselves considered from a particular point of view, acting in a certain way. It is not an organism, but an organization. When a society comes into existence it is not a new thing which is born, but a new state of things.² As Professor Lewis remarks, if St. Thomas teaches organic theory, then Bentham is the prince of organicists.

But here a further consideration arises. Every society is a Whole, and men are Parts. But they are more than just mere Parts; they are more correctly, as Gierke half saw, Partial Wholes. And this arises from the fact that men are not merely individuals, but are also persons. In this distinction is the key to the problem of the Common Good. The distinction is subtle, but it is fundamental; and it may be found worked

¹ "Sciendum est autem, quod hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo vel domestica familia, habet solum unitatem ordinis secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars ejus totius potest habere operationem quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicujus partium, sed totius, puta conflictus totius exercitus. Et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem. Est autem aliquid totum, quod habet unitatem non solum ordine, sed compositione, vel etiam continuitate, secundum quam unitatem est aliquid unum simpliciter, et ideo nulla est operatio partis quae non sit totius. In continuis enim idem est motus totius et partis; et similiter in compositis, vel colligatis, operatio partis principaliter est totius; et ideo oportet quod ad eandem scientiam pertineat talis consideratio et totius et partis ejus. Non autem ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare totum quod habet solum ordinis unitatem et partes ipsius" (*Comment. in Ethicorum ad Nicomachum*, Lib. I, lectio i. See also la pars, iii, 1).

² "La comparaison de la société à un organisme humain facilite la compréhension de l'union ainsi formée, mais elle ne pourrait être poussée à l'extrême sans erreur. Ce n'est pas un organisme, c'est une organisation: les organes de l'organisme sont des choses et leurs rapports à celui-ci relèvent de la biologie; les membres (par analogie les organes) de la société sont des personnes et leurs rapports avec elle relèvent de la sociologie." Mlle Suzanne Michel in *La Notion Thomiste du Bien Commun*, a Thesis presented at the University of Nancy, 1932, to which the present paper is deeply indebted.

out more fully than is here possible in the pregnant pages of Maritain's *Scholasticism and Politics*. Briefly we may say that by "person" we mean the spiritual principle which in the order of being unifies into a single whole the constituent elements of the human composition; and in the order of action becomes the centre of attribution and the responsible principle of human acts. The basis of personality is spiritual. On the other hand, it is matter which is the principle of individuation, and the individual is considered as that totality of material but accidental elements by which bodily, sexual, temperamental, racial and hereditary differences arise.¹

Now as individuals men possess certain goods, chiefly in the material order, such as wealth, health and bodily integrity. As persons they possess certain rights such as the right to truth, the right to found and rear a family, the right to possess property. And since a society is a unity of order among not merely individuals but among persons, the good of the society must be related in some way to personal goods and rights. The common good of the Group cannot be compared to the good of the One quite in the same way as the Whole is compared to the Part, or as a society is compared to its members. The society has no personality, while the members are persons. Yet the society is in some way the support and defence of personal goods and the maintainer of personal values. Hence we cannot too easily say that the personal good of a single member must override the common good of society. There is a scale of values in which the protection of the personal rights of the Totality takes precedence over the protection of those of the single Person (though I cannot see in what circumstances a conflict in the protection of such rights would arise); while the personal good of the One transcends the individual good not only of the One but also of the Many. Hence, I think we should say that the relationship between private good and common good is both quantitative and qualitative. The test of value is quantitative only in defect of a qualitative criterion, or rather, within each qualitative sphere or range.² Hence the good of the One, considered as an individual, is subject to the good of the Many. There is a quantitative relationship, and in a conflict of interests the good of the One may be obliged to yield to the good of

¹ Michel, op. cit., p. 45. Cp. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 61-2: "Man, in so far as he is a material individuality, has but a precarious unity, which wishes only to slip back into multiplicity; for matter as such tends to decompose itself. In so far as we are individuals, each of us is a fragment of a species, a part of this universe, a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we obey. We are subject to the determinism of the physical world. But each man is also a person and, in so far as he is a person, he is not subject to the stars and atoms; for he subsists entirely with the very subsistence of his spiritual soul, and the latter is in him a principle of creative unity, of independence and of freedom."

² "Il y a un rang entre les valeurs; tout au plus peut-on ajouter qu'au rang égal celle qui est incluse dans le Bien commun doit l'emporter sur celle qui est incluse dans le Bien particulier, la quantité servant de critère quand vient à manquer celui de la qualité. . . . Un Bien particulier se rapportant à la personne l'emportera sur le Bien commun se rapportant à l'individu. Quelque grand que soit le nombre des individus intéressés à ce Bien commun, le Bien particulier se rapportant à la personne tout isolé qu'il soit, le dépasse en grandeur." Michel, op. cit., pp. 47-8.

the Many.¹ But the good of the One, considered as a person, can never be sacrificed for the good of the Many.

There are varieties of groupings of men according to their purposes, and the mediaeval political philosophers usually saw four Lig divisions of groups, not exclusive, but inter-related and complementary. There is domestic society whose purpose is to prepare the members for right living. There is the village whose end is the protection of persons and property. Then the city whose duty is to provide for the citizens the good and sufficient life, and finally the kingdom which provides the same advantages as the city, but with greater security and tranquillity.² These smaller communities supply, as it were, the framework for good living and the fullness of the good life, peace, security, justice and order. But beyond these communities there is the universal community of Human Society, whose end is the Common Good in its fullest extension. This common good is not an individual but a personal good, or rather a totality of personal goods. It is the same as the ultimate end of man, the vision and enjoyment of God. And to this end all other ends are subordinated. This is the purpose of human society, not only to allow men to live well, but through this right living to come to the possession of God.³ And hence it is that man seeking his own true good necessarily seeks also the Common Good, and that in the ultimate analysis the good of the One and the good of the Whole are integrated in a single good, not only the *Commune Bonum*, but the *Summum Bonum*, and the Final End of all creation. Hence too the words of St. Thomas, and the culmination of his thought: *Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua . . . Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum.*⁴

¹ Thus, St. Thomas, I-II, xcii, 1; II-II, xxxiii, 3; II-II, xlvii, 10, ad 2; *Comment in Ethic*, lect. iii; C.G., iii, 17, no. 5. *Quodlib.*, I, 8.

² See, for example, Dante, *De Monarchia*, Lib. I, cap. v. St. Thomas presents a slightly different division. "Cum autem homini competat in multitudine vivere, quia sibi non sufficit ad necessaria vitae si solitarius maneat, oportet quod tanto sit perfectior multitudinis societas, quanto magis per se sufficiens erit ad necessaria vitae. Habetur siquidem aliqua vitae sufficientia in una familia domus unius, quantum scilicet ad naturales actus nutritionis, et prolis generandae, et aliorum huiusmodi; in uno autem dico, quantum ad ea quae ad unum artificium pertinent, in civitate vero quae est perfecta communitas, quantum ad omnia necessaria vitae; sed adhuc magis in provincia una propter necessitatem compugnationis et mutui auxilii contra hostes. . . ." *De Reg. Prin.*, I, i.

³ Cp. *De Reg. Prin.*, I, xiv. "Videtur autem ultimus finis esse multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem. Ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul bene vivant, quod consequi non posset unusquisque singulariter vivens; bona autem vita est secundum virtutem, virtuosa igitur vita est congregationis humanae finis. . . . Sed quia homo vivendo secundum virtutem ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione divina . . . oportet eundem finem esse multitudinis humanae, qui est hominis unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam."

⁴ I, II, xxi, 4 ad 3. It is not possible to work out in a short space the implications of this teaching with regard to the place which the Church ought to occupy in human society. Nor is it possible to do more than mention the suggestion sketched out rather than developed by Mlle Michel in her thesis, that the relationship of the Common Good to the private good is a relationship of form to matter in the full Thomist tradition. "Omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius sicut et materia propter formam: partes sunt enim quasi materia totius" (I, xlv, 2).

Hence Gierke was not wholly wrong, nor were his critics wholly right. The common good is the good of the Whole and also the good of the Parts, for as Maritain has put it, "finally speaking, society, being a whole of persons, is a whole of wholes". The interests of the One and the Many come into conflict only in the measure in which the one or the other turns away from its true end. There will be tensions in society, of course, in which individual good and advantage may have to surrender to the common weal. Such tensions are inevitable. But their solution is possible in the measure in which the law of personality prevails over the law of individuality both in the Parts and in the Whole. This ideal "can be progressively realized only by means of the development of a sacred feeling, as it were, for justice and honour, and by the development of law and civic friendship".¹ It is in the power of the clergy to work actively and effectively to this end, and so to promote to the full the pursuit of the Common Good.

ANDREW BECK, A.A.

PENTECOSTAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

WITH the conclusion of the Octave of the Holy Spirit we brought the great cycle of the liturgical year to an end. Perhaps, for a passing moment, we might find this ending of the cycle sad. We are so loth to part with it. It is, however, a sadness that is not liturgical. We part with nothing; for in this end is the beginning.

In the beginning was God. And on Trinity Sunday, with happy sequence and excellent consideration, when the cycle of the feasts is over, the Church takes us where all begins and ends: to that mysterious life of God, where the Father expresses, says, the contemplation of Himself in a Word which is a Second Person, called the Son, and where from the good Father and the good Son, as from one source, there proceeds the mutual love which is a Third Person, called the Holy Ghost. All the long calm Sundays that now ensue will have the quality of a celestial summer, and the duration and serenity of heaven will be in them.

In this way, though the introduction of the Feast of the Blessed Trinity into the Roman rite is not ancient (John XXII, 1334), it has an appropriateness, in its return, in its conclusive gathering, to God Himself, that makes

¹ Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

it immediately belong to the pattern and the movement of the Liturgy. The coming of the Holy Ghost and the turning of our face towards the Triune God are but two aspects of one finality, of one accomplishment. We are at leisure now. The work is done, the Church is founded, the Spirit is released.

The period between Pentecost and the beginning of the following Advent is not, therefore, a gap. It is the Church once founded by the Holy Spirit, and enduring down the centuries. The extensive, leisured, and dignified procession of the Saints in this post-Pentecostal time is but the living history of the living Church. The Liturgy is a single thing, a thing that represents and contains the whole economy of God in Christ. The division in the Missal and the Breviary of the *Proprium de Tempore* and the *Proprium de Sanctis* is a late mediaeval introduction. It is but a convenience of book-keeping which implies no division *a parte rei*. If a prudent father keeps domestic and educational expenses in separate columns in a book he does not thereby imply any division *a parte rei* in that one thing which is his home, his family. So too, in one Family, there is no division in the Liturgy. From start to finish it is all a *Proprium de Christo*.

It was expedient for us that Our Lord should go, for thus only could the Spirit be released. He loves all and He loves to the end of time. He loves so many and so long. How then can He satisfy His love? How can He release it? He must suffer first (*oportebat pati*). Inseparable from this mortality are all the penalties of the world of matter: the restrictions of time, of place, of corruptibility. Only a few could have Him in His mortal life. Victorious over these restrictions through His Resurrection, how should this victory extend to us? By His remaining carnally with us? True, being in a glorified body, we could not truly say of Him, in such circumstances, that He would now be getting on for two thousand years of age. But that He should be here all that time, in every place, with everyone, in this carnal way, suggests a fantastic series of miracles that recoils before our knowledge of the ordinary providence that belongs to the high dignity of God, who is the creator and not the destroyer of His own secondary causes.

Yet, be with us He will. How then? He leaves us carnally that He may return spiritually. When we use the expression, I am with you in spirit, we imply the restrictions both of the condition of our nature in this life and of our very nature itself (and perhaps give cold comfort to those who want the much more we would but cannot give). What we mean might be expressed by this emphasis, I am with you *in spirit*.

But Our Lord, who chose to be once, for our sake, subject to the irreproachable restrictions of our mortal condition, is God, a Divine Person in insearchable council with the Father and the Holy Ghost. Through His Incarnation He has become our suppliant lover. But it is *omnipotentia supplex*. With Him, whose wisdom and power are infinite in satisfying love, and who lives with the Father in the unity of the Holy Ghost, the

return to us in Spirit is unrestricted and victorious. He has overcome the world. Not only does He return to us in Spirit in the erection and vivifying of the Church. Through that Spirit too He Himself returns to us in the Mystery of Faith; God the Son in His divine nature, and in that lovely human nature He once took from one of us, Our Blessed Lady. The mind that might, for a human moment, idly speculate on what seems the restriction of not seeing Him is at once restored to understanding of the balance and the harmony in all God's works by remembering that we who believe, although we have not seen, have a blessing which, even had he never doubted, Thomas never could have had. One gets so fond of and is so grateful for one's faith. It is not as if He said, I am with you *in spirit*, but rather, I *am* with you in Spirit.

Omnia bene fecit. He has brought Himself into the easiest, the gentlest, and the simplest contact with us all, in every place, at every time. With what ease, what gentleness, and what simplicity He has approached us under the slender feather-weight of bread and the liquid pliancy of a small temperance of wine; lest, but for those sacramental veils, we should die if we beheld the thing we do. Certainly, when He said it was expedient that He should go, it was of no lonely ordeal for His followers that He was thinking. It was rather as if He soliloquized: the sooner I go, the sooner My Spirit will be released, so that everyone can have Me everywhere—even to the consummation of the world.

The Liturgy, then, representing and containing mystically the divine economy, has no sooner celebrated the founding of the Church than it brings us to the Feast of Corpus Christi. Note with what suitability it gives us, in this Feast, the Preface in *Nativitate*, and the doxology and short verse of Feasts of Our Lady. It is a veritable gift of Our Lord to us; it is He who first came to us through one of us, Our Lady, who is now ours. In the Mass as in the womb she still surrounds Him. He is the true Emmanuel, the God with us. Another Preface, etc., referring directly to the Blessed Sacrament would, of course, be good, but they would fall far short of the high conception of the Feast as part of one pattern of Liturgy.

Consider how His Spirit works in us. The Spirit so works that we are most active when we are most quiescent. We know, if I may put it this way, that the greatest thing we ever do is not to interfere with the Spirit of Our Lord in us. We know it in the calmness with which He enables us to give a word of comfort to this one; in the moderation with which we put the right brief counsel in a written sentence; in the gentle patience with which we wait for all our sowing to come to fruit through Him; we know it, in a word, in that tranquil way in which we keep a little in the rear of ourselves in all our sayings and our doings, that the *dulcis hospes* of our soul may operate. Our prayers are most profitable when we are more like listeners than speakers; our activity is most fruitful when we are more like instruments than hands. The surest, the most comforting, and the most satisfactory of all things is the knowledge of our

own nothingness and of His all in us. No truth shines more clearly than this through the Sunday Collects after Pentecost; through the long living of the Church.

The first thing we may note in these Collects is what we might call the earliness of the Holy Spirit of Our Lord. He is matutinal and His name is Oriens. No matter how we try to trace the origin of such light as is in us, He is there before us, both its source and substance. He is not merely in our prayer, but it is in Him that we were able to begin to pray.

Do we ask, *ut salutis aeternae remedia . . . (Deo) largiente consequamur*, they are first the *remedia quae (Deo) inspirante requirimus* (Ember Sat. Sept.). Do we wish to please God, He is the God whom we cannot please without God: *Quia tibi sine te placere non possumus* (18th after Pent.). Do we wish to have our requests answered, we need, that they may be answered, that God should first teach us what to ask: *Ut petentibus desiderata concedas; fac eos, quae tibi sunt placita, postulare* (9th after Pent.). Do we ask, *ut mereamur assequi quod promittis*, it can only be because we first depend on Him to love what He commands: *fac nos amare quod praecipis* (13th after Pent.). We have already met this truth in paschal time: *Da populus tuis id amare quod praecipis, id desiderare quod promittis* (4th after Easter).

There is no need to multiply these splendid things. The Missal teems with them. The whole theology of grace is in this earliness, this anticipation, of the Holy Ghost, and these Collects are the articulate comfort of the Church that knows, *sine me nihil potestis facere*. Nothing more comforting was ever said.

In many unliturgical prayers you will seek in vain for this classic Roman quality. That does not mean that they are not good prayers. It is just that one feels at times that they are too good; too good for oneself; presupposing, as they often do, an advanced piety in the one who says them, and containing, as they easily may, an element of feeling or sentiment which one may not command at will. The Roman Collect presupposes nothing except what virtue God has put in us, prescinding modestly from the much or little (or no) use one has made of it. In this way, the manners of the Liturgy are perfect, and there is no intrusion on the sanctuary of our conscience.

It is most consoling. Some of us, in our childhood, may have thought from the general demeanour of teachers, nuns, and even priests, that something spiritual was expected of us which we could not achieve. It may have seemed that everybody was so holy, and that nobody had time to wrestle with the point that we were not. If it were so, one loses this depressing and misleading vagrancy when one discovers through the homely, the family, Liturgy, that one has a Mother (for so the Church is) who is kind enough to have no illusions of any kind regarding her beloved children. The Mother that begot us in Our Lord knows all about us. Being flesh of His flesh we are of her flesh too (for the Church is Christ), and maternal charities are deepest in their knowledge of unspoken frailty.

If a short digression may be pardoned, how dangerous it is to depart from the humble spirit of the Liturgy when catechizing others. It is, for instance, depressing (especially with children and with adolescents) to exceed *pro forma*, or just because we are priests, the grace the Spirit gives us in our catechizing (or in preaching, though the latter is a thing of less importance). The good catechist is the one who makes it a rule never to anticipate but always to follow the action of the Holy Spirit in the souls of his hearers. To do that he must take this other rule : never to anticipate but always to follow the action of the Holy Spirit in his own soul. If the people are to profit by their hearing, they must hear a priest who is first a listener himself. The catechizing that does others good is the catechizing that does oneself good as one gives it.

Just as there is no presumption of sanctity, so there is no demand for or expectation of feeling or sentiment in the Roman prayer. Just because it is content to deal with facts it brings a sort of free delight. It is entirely occupied with God's size, God's goodness, God's forestalling, and sees only what is God in us.

Yet, it is we who say the prayer. What is the one word which describes the quality of the prayer we say ? Is it not just this : aspiration ? It is prayer itself, the raising of the mind and heart to God. With or without feeling or sentiment, with or without high sanctity in whosoever says it, the Roman Collect takes us from the depth of our nothingness up to the very throne of God.

If one cannot get at the heart of great verse by analysis, how can one get to the heart of this prayer by analysing ? Rather let these Collects cause of themselves their tranquil surging. Take any phrases that occur : *Insere pectoribus nostris amorem tui nominis ; Sic transeamus per bona temporalia ut non amittamus aeterna ; Largire spiritum cogitandi quae recta sunt, propitius et agendi ; Da nobis in eodem Spiritu recta sapere.* But to appreciate the full quality and unity of aspiration, to appreciate the thing I cannot say, take some entire prayer. For instance, this : *Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, qui abundantia pietatis tuae et merita supplicum exedis et vota : effunde super nos misericordiam tuam ; ut dimittas quae conscientia metuit, et adjicias quae oratio non praesumit* (11th after Pent.). That prayer is Liturgy. It is that art which God and man combine to make. Like all great art, it seems, on its human side, to be entirely simple and unselfconscious—like one of Cimabue's frescoes.

The opinion that the quality of these Collects is the quality of aspiration is historically defensible. The Collect is the summary of the silent prayer of the people on a subject previously proposed by the celebrant. The people pray, usually perhaps with arms raised up and hands extended, or kneeling on certain occasions (*flectamus genua*). After they had prayed for some time, there followed the short résumé of their thoughts which is our present Collect. It is but natural that such a résumé should take the form of aspiration.

There has, of course, to be a sort of industry in saying Mass. One is doing, not merely saying, something. Again, one must not keep the congregation unreasonably long. That is fatiguing for all, for all want the Mass to happen in a customary amount of time.

But it is quite consistent with this that, within a kind of happy briskness, we should know a lingering eternity at times. We glimpse it, as we move along, through casements that open on the world of the Spirit. It is a passing and momentary perception; something that lifts the very heart of us. It may be something in a prayer at Mass: *Ipsi quoque mente in coelestibus habitemus; Deus, quem nosse vivere, cui servire regnare est; Inter mundanas varietates ibi nostra fixa sint corda, ubi vera sunt gaudia.* Or it may be the simplest few words here and there: *Quanta fecit Dominus animae meae; Ad vitam perveniamus aeternam.* Or it may be just a graphic description of heaven itself, opening high above us and admitting all the people. How that, for instance, swells the heart: *Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas . . . illuc enim ascenderunt tribus, tribus Domini.* In such phrases as that quotation from the Psalms, inserted in a Missal context, the entire economy of God seems focused, and all its beauty too; the whole of grace and nature meet, and around the Person of Our Lord all that has been since He came, and all the old renown of God's earlier commerce with the House of Adam, are gathered for a moment.

Indeed, every Mass, every day, everywhere, is full of those brief but timeless, intense but tranquil, small but limitless, bestowings. Each priest knows what most appeals to him. It is not for any one of us to say in what way another finds eternity within the thirty minutes of the Mass. When we tie the girdle round us as we vest, each of us knows a slave is then unbound within God's cited liberties; but how each one takes his freedom is for the guidance of the Holy Spirit. It is the secret too of each one who comes down from the altar what pictures he remembers when he thinks: *vidi sanctam civitatem.*

But one thing we all share in common, a happy comfort swung between our own nothingness and God. Not that we have a very exalted concept even of our nothingness. It is just that we do understand things like this: that God is there, that the Holy Spirit is before and in us all; even though one of us may be a bit tongue-tied in the early morning; or though another may suffer from incurable (and harmless) fussiness or scrupulosity; or though a third may often have tried to attend to the meaning of all the words of Mass from start to finish and never once succeeded yet in doing so; or though a fourth may have grievous and sullen thoughts to bother him when, *spreto cubili*, he and his liver get up of a morning.

What matter, facts still remain. We may have the habit of saying every Wednesday morning: *licet in me aliquod boni operis testimonium non agnoscas, officium saltem dispensationis creditae non recuses*, and all the excellent imperpersonalities that follow in the great Ambrosian prayer. However frail may be our hold on the admonition we got at ordination to imitate what we

handle, at least we do handle Him at Mass. We do look forward to our daily Mass, and are pleased to forget our poverty and dimness. For after all, though He will not save us without our effort, our sanctification is the work of His Spirit. And it is not those who could imagine themselves to be something that have any stature. Rather is it *quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur* who are the sons of God.

JOHN P. MURPHY.

HOMILETICS

Fifteenth Sunday after Pentecost

"The Will of God your Sanctification" (Luke vii, 11-16)

"WHOM when the Lord had seen, being moved with mercy towards her he said to her, Weep not." St. Luke is particularly careful to call Jesus Christ here "the Lord", i.e. the Master and Lord of creation whose wise providence rules all things, reaching from end to end strongly disposing all things sweetly. From the providential (i.e. the only real) point of view the woman's loss was not an accident. The Lord had arranged it; He had brought it about and He was in a real sense the cause of the woman's grief. Her seemingly futile suffering was His doing. Not a sparrow falls without the Father's permission, and thus the widow's only son would not have died unless the Lord had allowed it. Her suffering was manifestly part of His divine plan, yet when He sees her sorrow, He is moved with mercy; and infinite and eternal love prompts Him to work a miracle and raise the dead to life. Because He loved the mother He gave her back her son.

It is the same on the occasion of the raising of Lazarus. "When Mary therefore was come where Jesus was, seeing him she fell down at his feet and said to him: Lord, if thou hadst been here my brother had not died. Jesus therefore when he saw her weeping and the Jews that were come with her weeping, groaned in spirit and troubled himself and said: Where have you laid him? They said to him, Lord, Come and see. And Jesus wept. The Jews therefore said: Behold how he loved him. But some of them said: Could not he that opened the eyes of the man born blind have caused that this man should not die?" (Jn. xi, 32-7.) Of course He could, just as He could have prevented the death of the widow's son.

Yet the same onlookers who asked the question had also said, See how He loved him. That too was true and clear to everyone. He loved Lazarus, He loved Martha and Mary, He loved the widow and her son; and in the bowels of His infinite mercy He condescended to show His divine love. Not only was the miracle due to His love, but also the death that preceded it. That perhaps is a fact we are inclined to overlook. In each case the death, the consequent suffering and sorrow, and the miracle were all equally the result of His love. That is a profound thought full of wonderful consequences and precious lessons.

There are two kinds of evil, moral and physical. Evil, as such, because it is evil, can never be desirable. Neither God nor man can love it in itself. A thing has only to be presented to us as evil for us to fear it, hate it, shrink from it. The evil of *sin* can never be caused or chosen by God. He can give it no place in His plan. Even pain, suffering, sorrow and death God cannot choose directly as such, i.e. as evils: they are ordered and arranged only in relation to some good. These two miracles teach us something of the mystery of suffering and show us the spirit in which Our Lord regarded it. Suffering can only be understood in terms of divine love—as something willed for us by Omnipotent Love for our highest good. Our Lord consoled the widow because He loved her. He sent her the most bitter of all sorrows, the loss of her only son, also because He loved her. Bereavement and miracle were both love-gifts.

How often in sorrow do people cry out in doubt of God's goodness. Why does God allow suffering? Why has He taken my only son? Why doesn't He stop the war? Why did He permit it? The answer (and it is a hard saying) is that moral evil (*sin*) can have no part in God's scheme of things, but physical evil has its place in His plan: He sends it to us for our greater and higher good.

Now suffering, as such, has no moral value or sanctifying effect. If not dealt with properly by the will, if not accepted in the right spirit and if not recognized as coming from God, it may do more harm to the soul than it does to the body. Suffering may embitter; ill-health may make a man selfish or petulant. Even an otherwise good man will find that a violent toothache does not put him in the best frame of mind to be sweet and charitable with bores or to suffer fools gladly. No. By itself suffering is not necessarily sanctifying; but if, either because of it or in spite of it, we cling to God and His adorable will, then we are accepting it in the spirit in which it is given and returning love for love.

St. Paul tells us that Our Lord learned obedience from the things He suffered. Suffering is not a sign of greater love, but it is a greater sign of the same love. The sorrow that follows from failure and defeat weighs upon us heavily and causes intense disappointment and utter dejection; but accepted courageously, it is more likely to lead us to God, because it shows the vanity of everything that is not God. Any suffering or wrong, real or imaginary, will have one of two effects—it will either bring us nearer to God or part us from Him. Everything comes from His will; and suffering is the stinging test which makes us face His will either to embrace or reject it.

What men call fate, chance, necessity, destiny, the inevitable, should really be called the will of God. Suffering, illness, grievances, injustice,

calamity, failure, misunderstanding are bad names we give to the highest love.

Our Lord learned obedience from the things He suffered. We can know theoretically that obedience is the conforming of our will to the will of God ; but suffering, patiently accepted, is the translation of the lesson into simple practice.

The secret of life is to accept the will of God. Life isn't always good, but it is quite certain that the only good that succeeds in the end is the grateful acceptance of life with humility and love as a love-gift from God. St. Paul gloried in his tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience ; and he taught that the members of the mystical body "must fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh, for his body which is the church".

St. Paul's spirit was manifest in the poor starving woman who prayed: "Lord, if you will not give me bread, please anyhow give me patience."

"And the Lord direct your hearts in the charity of God and the patience of Christ." (Thess. iii, 5.)

Sixteenth Sunday after Pentecost

Humility. (Luke xiv, 1-11.)

"They watched him." We are not told that the lawyers and Pharisees said anything ; but it is clear, as it was clear to those concerned, that Our Lord was reading their thoughts, and He answers their unspoken questions, and disputes with them to their own confusion, though their part in the dialogue is a stony silence.

St. Bede the Venerable, in his homily on this gospel, says it was according to a providential arrangement that Our Lord cured dropsy in the presence of these Pharisees because the poor man's dropsical body was a fit symbol of the diseased state of their souls. The parable of the guests seeking the first places at the wedding is a commentary upon their behaviour on the present occasion gathered together to eat bread in the Chief Pharisee's house.

Our Lord is inculcating humility—a virtue which the Pharisees and lawyers conspicuously lacked.

Humility is founded upon (1) reverence for God ; (2) a sense of proportion ; (3) a love of truth.

Our Lord's critics on this occasion had no reverence for Him. They were present to watch and take down evidence against Him. They show their lack of a sense of proportion by ignoring His merciful action towards the sick man and insisting on their own legal niceties in the presence of the divine law-giver. If they had recognized Him they would not have been competing with one another for the first places, but rather they would have been in the frame of mind of St. Peter when he said, "Depart from me for I am a sinful man, O Lord." They were self-deceived and hypocritical and thus showed how far they were from love of truth.

We may all incur the condemnation Our Lord levelled at the Pharisees

and, in our blindness, not perceive that our souls are dropsical and swollen with pride. To learn humility then we must have :

(1) *True reverence for God* : This is the confession of our littleness and dependence and the acknowledgement of the infinite majesty of God. Reverence is the prostration of our being before the blinding glory of God. It is accompanied by fear—the fear lest we be separated from Him, yet also the fear to approach Him or to set up our own smallness against His divine greatness. St. Thomas, in describing this instinctive fear, speaks of the *resilitio in propriam parvitatem*, “the leaping back into our own little nothingness”. He is all : we are nothing. The trembling reverence of the soul before the magnificence and greatness of God humbles and effaces the soul to nothingness. True reverence for God causes true humility.

(2) *A sense of proportion*, i.e. we must see things as they are, big things as big, small things as small. To strain at gnats and swallow camels shows a lack of a sense of proportion. We must judge greatness by the right standard of greatness. If we measure ourselves against a pigmy we shall appear as giants : but if we stand at the foot of some towering mountain we shall be dwarfed to nothingness. In the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed man is king. We have but to measure ourselves by the divine standard of greatness, and real humility is the sequel.

(3) *A love of truth*. Humility at all times inclines us to follow the dictates of right reason. It is not humility to refuse to acknowledge or use the good gifts we owe to the generosity of God. St. Thomas says the ambitious are always superfluously (and falsely) humble. St. Paul gives a very practical but difficult counsel when he tells us to esteem others better than ourselves. Can we in all honesty do this ? In a world of dictators, murderers and swindlers, can I say truthfully that I really think I am worse than such as these ? The saints of course said they were the worst sinners in the world. Did they mean it ? and did they believe it ? Most certainly they did. St. Thomas explains how they could say it and how we ought to try to say it too. His argument is somewhat in this manner : reflect on the truth that whatever I have of positive perfection is from God. The only thing I have of myself is my failure to do God's will, that collapse which we call sin—that is the only thing in me that God doesn't cause. So only my sin is mine and that's all I have to boast of ! Then as to the swindlers and criminals ? Well, only about myself have I any real, exact, positive knowledge of wilful sin. I know my own sins from inner consciousness, from my own realization of guilt, from personal and inside knowledge. The sins of the others (however wicked they may seem) I only know from hearsay and outside report. I can't examine their consciences. There is certainly no one of whom I know more certain evil than of myself. So that I can say that, as far as I know, I am the worst sinner in the world, and thus I am helped to rise to the height of St. Paul's advice : Esteem others better than yourself.

Humility is a difficult virtue : to become self-conscious about it means that it straightway vanishes. It has many counterfeits ; and self-deception, which was the danger of the Pharisees, may easily be our danger too. So beware of the leaven of the Pharisees in ourselves. We can only safely go to Our Lord and try to learn of Him who was meek and humble of heart.

*Seventeenth Sunday after Pentecost**Theory and Practice. (Matthew xxii, 35-46.)*

Our Lord had just refuted and silenced the Sadducees (verse 34). The Pharisees could scarcely have been sorry to see their enemies defeated even by Him whose destruction they were at the time actually plotting; but they were on their guard and very cautious. St. John Chrysostom says they came in force: they put forward one of their number, a brilliant young scribe, as spokesman so that if he (like the Sadducees) were to be confounded by Our Lord, it might only seem to be his personal defeat; whereas if he were victorious it might appear as the victory of them all. They were great sticklers for legal forms, and in view of the coming trial of Our Lord, which they were carefully preparing, it was necessary to gather evidence against Him.

The question, "Master, which is the greatest commandment in the law?" was an attempt to cross-examine and draw Him out rather than a request for information, a challenge to start a debate, one of those animated, speculative discussions dear to the legal tribe. Which of all the innumerable outward observances of the worship of God is the greatest? Our Lord answers that the love of God above all and our neighbour as ourself is the whole law, the perfect law of charity which implies the total surrender of our whole being to God. Without that there is no life worthy of the name. "He who loveth not abideth in death." Without true charity there can be no peace or happiness in this world and no salvation in the next.

Then Our Lord counter-attacks and turns the tables on His questioners. They are seeking material for the business of His legal prosecution: they shall have it! "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is He?" Mark the tense, Whose son *is* He? not, Whose *shall* He be? Has He come then? Our Lord knows their thoughts. They can only answer, "David's." He reminds them of Psalm cix, where David's son is also declared to be David's Lord and David's God. St. Mark says in the parallel passage "and a great multitude heard Him gladly". They believed, and it seems were able to draw the conclusion from Our Lord's words, shyly suggesting His divinity; but the Pharisees are unconvinced: more than a hint has been given them but they cannot or will not take it. Why does Our Lord seem reluctant to be more explicit? Is it lest He should involve them in the greater condemnation?

These unfortunate men were legal experts, great sticklers for the outward observance of minute regulations (washings and cleansings), blinded by their preoccupation with theories for theories' sake, blind leaders of the blind.

All of us are liable to the danger of being caught up in the machinery of religion, accepting it and discussing it as a theory and not living it as a LIFE. "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is He?" is the eternally pertinent question. The Christian life doesn't mean just accepting the faith theoretically; it does not mean merely subscribing to some vague moral ideal, or wearing a uniform or some external badge. (Have we not our phylacteries and fringes even today?) A Christian is one who

follows Christ, taking him on *His* terms and believing Him to be what He claimed to be, Son of God and Son of man. No neutrality or indifference! We must be for or against, friends or foes. A true Christian is one who bases his whole life on the teaching, precepts and counsels of Jesus Christ. In practice that life means the striving to fulfil God's will and to imitate as well as we can the virtues of which Our Lord gave the world a divine example. It follows our Lord's own desires and seeks nothing less than the joy of intimate friendship with God through Christ. Our Lord himself said, "I have called you friends because all things whatsoever I have heard from my Father I have made known to you."

"For all you are children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ. . . . You are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. iii, 26). Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ—the more than royal robe of His friendship.

Religion as an abstraction, a theory, is non-existent. As a really existing thing in a real world it can only exist by becoming alive in a real person. Thus when we are speaking of realities we speak of a religious man or woman, a good deed, a Christ-like thought or word. Living faith isn't an intellectual scheme or an abstract philosophy; it means adherence to a living Person, Jesus Christ our Lord; practical, living Christianity means to be identified with Him, to think His thoughts, live His life, act as we know He would have us act, to be so intimately one with Him that we are truly, as it were, members of the body of which He is head.

In his fifth Peace Point the Pope recalls us all to the renewal of this Christian spirit without which all peace efforts and reconstruction are foredoomed to fail. The first step back to the achievement of this spirit is the step back to God's friendship which we call repentance. "Repent and believe the Gospel", "Cast off the works of darkness", "Put on the Lord Jesus Christ"—nice-sounding phrases, pleasant pulpit platitudes! Let them cease to be detached abstractions and make them concrete realities. In the next twenty-four hours let each of us do something of which we know Our Lord would completely approve, apologize to the person you may have offended, forgive that other who has offended you, avoid that place or person that caused you to sin. And if we find we fail in these wholesome resolutions, then we will kneel down and say the prayer that Our Lord praised in the publican, "O God be merciful to me a sinner." The Christian life is friendship with Christ; and friendship is proved not by what we say or think or feel, but by what we do.

Our Lord sums it up: "If you love me, keep my commandments."

Eighteenth Sunday after Pentecost

The Sacrament of Penance. (Matthew ix, 1-8.)

"If we confess our sins he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all iniquity" (I John i, 9).

"Be of good heart, son, thy sins are forgiven thee." The Pharisees said to themselves that this was blasphemy and Our Lord saw and heard

the unspoken thoughts of their hearts. "Why do you think evil in your hearts? Which is easier to say, Thy sins are forgiven thee; or to say, Arise, and walk?" Then Our Lord works the visible miracle to show forth the sacramental action (real though invisible) in His forgiveness of the sick man.

He has power and authority to deal with disease in a sick body; and He has power also to deal with the disease of sin in a sick soul.

This power and authority He gave to His apostles, and through them to the world, on the first Easter Sunday when He rose from the dead. In the Sacrament of Penance He raised all who were buried under the weight of sin to His own everlasting life. He appeared in the midst of His startled disciples in the upper room and said to them, "Peace be unto you," then He gave them power to forgive and retain sin and in this Sacrament He gathered up all the fruits of his resurrection.

Penance, the virtue and sacrament by which we are reconciled to God and without which the human race (even with God's grace) could scarcely have persevered in well-doing, without falling back into the death of sin is one of the greatest pledges of God's love. It fills us with confidence that we are still loved even by the Love that has been outraged by sin, a love that heals and pardons.

Of course the pardon is not an unconditional one. The conditions are Confession, Contrition and Satisfaction. By sin a man does three wrongs: (1) to himself, (2) to his neighbour, and (3) to God. He injures himself by destroying or impairing the life of his own soul; his neighbour, not merely by scandalizing him or depriving him of some good, but (because we are all members of one another) even by a secret and solitary sin he wrongs him and the Church by withdrawing some degree of holiness which it is in his power to contribute to the life of the mystical body.

Hence the sinner owes amends to his own soul, to his neighbour (and the Church), and to God. He must therefore return to God by repentance; he must seek to be reconciled to the Church; and he must repair the evil within himself by contrition, confession, and satisfaction.

God pardons.

The Church reconciles through the priest, who absolves and imposes penance or penalty.

The sinner brings the *cor contritum*, a broken heart which is broken in order to be remade by grace and goodwill. The sinner has also to confess. Confession is the voluntary acknowledgement of sins according to their kind, number, gravity and any circumstance which may seriously aggravate them. Satisfaction is the reparation the sinner willingly makes for having outraged God and injured his neighbour.

The Church absolves through her ministers, whom she has given power and jurisdiction to apply the redeeming blood of Christ to sinful souls. Every member of the Church, Pope, bishops, priest and laity, must from time to time privately approach some priest, duly ordained and delegated to hear confession; for sacramental absolution.

There would seem to be almost a psychological need for confession to another human being. Psycho-therapy and the "group movement" must at least bear witness to this instinct! Our Lord, who knew what was in the heart of man, has made of confession the material of a sacrament. By frank confession

sion to another human being (and not merely to ourselves in the secrecy of our private meditation) we assure ourselves of our sincerity. Confidence will not be abused because the priest who guards our secret is bound by the strictest obligation of inviolable silence.

The confessional (which the late G. K. Chesterton in his Autobiography calls "the throne of candour") is not only the means of forgiving sin; it undermines and checks sin. It exposes the hideousness of sin to our own eyes and corrects the tendency, common to us all, to think too well of ourselves and to presume on a goodwill we may not possess or on a natural ability to achieve virtue without effort and caution and great trust in God's grace. It strips souls of hypocrisy and unmask the pharisee in many of us. It helps to break bad habits and introduces constructively good habits. It brings to a stricken soul the assurance of God's pardon, to a tortured mind and anxious heart calm and courage to face the consequences of the folly of sin. It saves men from the despair of ever recovering lost ideals or broken self-respect. It is a spiritual resurrection.

We confess, we express our sorrow, ask pardon and promise amendment in the hearing of another who is there not to punish but to pardon, not to scold and deride but to sympathize and encourage.

Our Lord began the institution of this sacrament by saying, "Peace be to you"; and it should bring us peace. Absolution is the healing word of peace. "You are clean by reason of the word which I have spoken to you." (John xv, 3.)

BERNARD DELANY, O.P.

NOTES ON RECENT WORK

LITURGICAL ARTS AND CRAFTS

THE arts languish in wartime. But the unimagined horrors of the present war have revealed new and weird visions of beauty which many of our artists have impressively recorded. Amongst the paintings by members of the various Services on exhibition at the National Gallery are pictures of raids and burning buildings and guns in action which are unforgettable. Unfortunately there is very little doing in the fields of liturgical art. This period of inactivity may have something of the value of a spiritual retreat: it may help us to sort out and adjust our ideas in a way that will prove profitable when the time of reconstruction arrives. There should be great and unprecedented opportunities for Catholic artists ahead, and perhaps we may be able to shake ourselves free for ever from the vulgar productions of foreign manufactories. A great book has arrived at the right moment. It

would be no exaggeration to say that Mr. E. I. Watkin's *Catholic Art and Culture*¹ is the most important book on an all-important subject that has so far appeared in this country. It is a work that should be studied attentively by all those who are interested to restore dignity and decency to liturgical art, particularly by priests and artists for whom the subject has practical bearings.

Mr. Watkin's essay is absorbingly interesting, but far from being light reading; a solid foundational knowledge of Catholic philosophy and the kindred sciences is presupposed. This is not to say that it may not be read with appreciation by a person of ordinary intelligence and education. The subject is conveniently classified according to the seasons: the early Christian Spring succeeded to the Classical Autumn; Mediaeval Christendom was the Summer; the period of Disintegration and the Renaissance were the late Summer; the Age of Baroque was Autumn; and the Modern World is Winter.

The first Christians were not interested in art and culture. They were convinced that their citizenship was in heaven and that here was no abiding city, and that classical culture was indelibly stained with all that was hateful to their religion. "Moreover, as a spiritual and supernatural religion Christianity did not embody the horizontal movement of the human mind which finds expression in secular knowledge, in culture and in art, a movement in harmony with the deification by pagan nature religions of natural forces and human powers. It embodied the vertical movement upward to God, downward to the depths of the soul, the movement that would find classical utterance in Augustine's dictum that he wished to know God and the soul and if he knew them would gain nothing by knowing anything besides" (p. 2).

Nevertheless, from the beginning the principle of a new culture and art was inherent in the new religion. The earliest Christian representations were mainly symbolic and intended to convey religious instruction. Although the artists had no aesthetic purpose they were inevitably influenced by pagan art. Early Christian austerity did not encourage artistic development. Many of the most ancient collects express contempt for the things of this world and ask for the grace "terrena despiciere". But, as the author points out, nothing prevents us from understanding the word "despicere" literally in the correct sense of looking down upon; to look down on earthly things from the height of God to whom we are supernaturally united. This is the Christian detachment for which we pray, and what is thus seen from above need not therefore be undervalued. In Christian culture there must be reconciliation between the horizontal movement of appreciation and the vertical Godward movement.

Clement of Alexandria enunciated the title-deed of Christian art when he admitted that it was meet to glorify God the Creator by the enjoyment of the sight of beautiful objects. "This is aesthetic delight in beauty for its own sake, its enjoyment regarded as praise of the Creator" (p. 12). Contact with pagan art and culture came for the most part through philosophy and literature; the best elements were absorbed and saved from perishing by being shaped to the Christian purpose.

¹ Burns Oates & Washbourne. Price 9s. net.

Mediaeval Christendom was the summer in which Christian art and culture rose to perfection of bloom. The Middle Ages must be viewed as a whole, the positive and the negative, avoiding extremes of idealism and of condemnation. All that is best in mediaeval religion, culture and civilization is expressed in Gothic art which overcame Hellenism and fulfilled it. Mr. Watkin does well to dispose of fanciful and poetical explanations of the transformation from the Romanesque to the Gothic arch: "It was a device of practical engineering." The following extracts are of special interest in that they re-echo and amplify ideas which were put forward in these pages a few years ago by the writer and which aroused some discussion.¹

"But the engineering motive did not alter the fact that the pointed architecture of Gothic expressed, though unintentionally, a soaring aspiration. . . . It was the symbol of the Godward ascent. . . . Within the cathedral there was an upward sweep of vision past the arcade, the triforium and the clerestory to the high vault. And outside there was a corresponding ascent to the central tower or spire" (p. 67). "But the breadth of the church as a whole could not correspond with the height or the length. For the vertical movement Godward overshadowed the horizontal that terminates in creatures. And the Incarnation of Infinity set going a movement towards its embodiment that can never be completed and which is aptly symbolized by the length and the inconclusive westward extension of the Gothic cathedral. Perfect symmetry implies and demands the finite vista which the Infinite destroys" (p. 68).

One is tempted to borrow liberally from this fascinating book and to indulge in full-length summaries. Considerations of space will permit only of brief indications as to the substance of succeeding chapters. Disintegration began in the fourteenth century. Then came the Renaissance which was a recovery of the complete cultural inheritance of Greece and Rome. The paganism of the Renaissance has been grossly exaggerated, and the best exemplars of the movement were strong Catholics. The art of the time reflected the abiding supremacy of Christianity, and Christian subjects far outnumbered secular (p. 87).

The highest achievements of art were still devoted to the adornment of churches, and Papal Rome became the artistic capital of Europe. The very human Madonnas and Divine Infants of Renaissance painting frequently raise a query as to whether the artists were sincerely interested in the religious import of their subjects or were merely using them as disguises for their secular humanist interests. For some the secular interest was undoubtedly predominant; Leonardo's somewhat effeminate Christ of the Last Supper is an instance. "Nevertheless the simple fact that the majority of Renaissance artists were sincere Catholics made it impossible for them to paint or chisel as pagans. They could not, even if they would, forget that Christ had come and that man had an immortal soul to lose or save" (p. 87).

But the spirit of mediaeval Catholic culture, inherited from antiquity, did not die. "The Renaissance was to conclude with an artist who more perfectly than any other, more perfectly even than the Gothic cathedral, embodied the synthesis of Christianity and humanism, of nature and the supernatural, the vertical and the horizontal movements. He is Michael

¹ THE CLERGY REVIEW, 1938, XV, pp. 437-41; 1939, XVI, pp. 90, 186.

Angelo. The heart of the Catholic Church, the private chapel of her head is the centre of Christian art" (p. 88).

The Counter-Reformation was in part an attempt to re-establish in every sphere the Catholic culture of the past in forms and manners suitable to the changed conditions. It was successful in so far as it did establish and maintain in Catholic countries for more than two centuries "... a living Catholic religion-culture continuous with the old. We may call it from the name of its art Baroque."

The Baroque period was the autumn of Catholic art and culture. In recent years more sympathetic and serious study has been devoted to Baroque art. Competent judges have looked upon it and decided that it is good. It is no longer customary to set Baroque art in opposition to Gothic and to condemn on that score. It is startling to be told that it is being recognized in many quarters that Baroque art, far from being opposed to Gothic, was its legitimate heir and continued it as the culture it expressed continued the culture of mediaeval Europe. One final excerpt will suffice to indicate the arresting train of thought which runs throughout a splendid chapter: "Our definition of Baroque is therefore interior, because its criterion is not technique nor any language of external form, but the spirit which inspired and moulded the outer forms. And that spirit was Gothic, the outer forms classical. Being interior, our definition is, as we have just seen, equally applicable to Baroque literature and in general to Baroque culture. We are in no danger of forgetting that every genuine art is the organic expression of a culture. And the culture in turn is informed and inspired by a view of reality which must be religious or, since a pure negation can inform nothing, pseudo-religious. That is to say, it must be, as every culture has always been, a religion-culture, or what Fascism and Communism are seeking to impose, a pseudo-religion-culture" (p. 96).

The final chapter, *Winter: the Modern World*, strikes a depressing note, one, however, which is both a warning and a summons to a revival of activity and enthusiasm. The conditions of Europe in the nineteenth century have been such that there could be no question of a Catholic culture or of a Catholic art expressing a collective vision of Catholic truth. Antichristian secularism has advanced with ever-increasing force. "In fact Catholic art degenerated for the most part into commercialized production of lifeless sentimentalities. 'Catholic repository next door to Woolworth's'; the notice put up in a certain church porch informed us with a truth beyond intention." Is there any hope for the future? Is all individualism to be swamped by the floods of National Socialism, Fascism, Russian Communism?

"The Kingdom of the Spirit, as all signs, not the least the liturgical movement, suggest, will realize, as never before, the spiritual solidarity of souls in supernatural union with God, the solidarity of Christ's mystical body. Above individualism and socialism is the communion of saints. Since this solidarity is spiritual and supernatural it will not sacrifice reason or the individual" (p. 166).

Unfortunately, attempts to form a new Catholic art, confined to a minority and not likely to achieve much, are animated by a feverish desire to make a complete break with the organic Catholic culture of the past, and to press Catholic ideas into one or other of those shapeless, meaningless and essen-

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tially materialist "isms" which are the very negation of life-giving continuity and the expression of restlessness and revolt.

Boxlike churches, freakish constructions of concrete or brick in what Mr. Watkin describes as the "factory style", belong to horizontalism and have little affinity with the vertical movement towards God. Lack of inspiration, paucity of ideas and originality, are not infrequently the motives which drive artists into eccentricities. Catholic artists who turn their backs upon the great Catholic tradition which they have not troubled to study and understand, who even speak of it scornfully in platitudinous phrases, and strive zealously to express Catholic ideas in one or other of the "isms", are recommended to ponder well the following: "It is perhaps significant that of all this contemporary Catholic art nothing strikes us as truly artistic, save that which continues and reinterprets a traditional style. So assuredly will it be with the religion of the future. It will be genuine religion, religion as it has been known in the past, not mere religiosity wearing the clothes of religion" (p. 168).

J. P. REDMOND.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

PROCEDURE IN BAPTIZING CHILDREN

Is it possible to set out simply in the form of a chart the correct procedure and rules for receiving young children of various ages into the Church, and for baptizing them conditionally? (L.)

REPLY

Questions on the subject have been dealt with at various times in this REVIEW, the references to which will be found below. The chart does not include baptisms in danger of death, nor the supplying of ceremonies omitted on such occasions. We believe it is correct; but there are some aspects of these cases which are unchartable: Cf. 1936, XII, p. 495, discussing the intention requisite; and 1939, XVI, p. 71, parental consent.

In compiling the chart we have kept in mind, in addition to the common law, the directions of the Westminster Provincial Councils and the rubrics of our *Ordo Administrandi* which are of obligation throughout this country. We have naturally not taken into account local diocesan legislation which

may determine doubtful points such as those mentioned in Notes 4 and 5; this is of obligation in those dioceses alone.

	Ordinary's Intervention Necessary? (3)	Dispositions Required in the Subject? (5)	Censure Incurred (6)	Ceremonies to be Employed? (7)	Sponsor Required? (8)	Convert Form to be Used? (9)
A. ABSOLUTE:						
Up to 7 (1)	No (4)	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
7 onwards (2)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No (9)
B. CONDITIONAL:						
Catholics up to 7	No	No	No	Yes, if former- ly omitted; otherwise op- tional	Permis- sible	No
Non-Catho- lics up to 7	No (4)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Catholics 7 onwards	No	Yes	No	Yes, if former- ly omitted; otherwise op- tional	Permis- sible	No
Non-Catho- lics 7 to 14 or 12 (2)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes, <i>minus</i> absolution from cen- sure (9)
Non-Catho- lics 14 or 12 onwards	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes

EXPLANATORY NOTES

(1) Canon 745, §2. A candidate is an adult when he has reached the age of reason, which, from canon 88, §3, is presumed to be the age of seven years completed, a presumption, however, which yields to proof of the contrary. Cf. canons 1825-1828.

(2) A censure cannot be incurred by an unbaptized person. Therefore, in the case of absolute baptism it is irrelevant whether the candidate has reached the age of puberty or not. A baptized person does not incur censure before this age. From canon 88, §2, the age of puberty is presumed to be 14 for males and 12 for females. In our view one may follow the probable opinion which, for the purpose of censures, regards the age as 14 for both sexes, unless local law directs that the rule of canon 88, §2, must be strictly followed. Cf. CLERGY REVIEW, 1939, XVII, p. 353.

(3) The absolute baptism of adults must be referred to the Ordinary in principle from canon 744. The conditional baptism of adult reputed

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heretics needs the Ordinary's intervention in so far as it accompanies reconciliation with the Church. This is the common law from canon 2314, §2, when the censure has been incurred. Moreover, the English bishops in 1902 reserved the reconciliation of all converts to themselves. Cf. *Westm. Dioces. Synod*, XLI, 1902, p. 21.

(4) Cf. canon 751. The infant children of non-Catholic parents are lawfully baptized, whether absolutely or conditionally, provided a guarantee is obtained from the parents or other responsible persons that they will be educated as Catholics, and no reference to the Ordinary is necessary in the common law. Doubtful cases should be referred to him.

(5) By "dispositions" we mean: intention, instruction and attrition, as in canon 752. For the absolute baptism of adults, minister and subject should be fasting (deceit); Mass with Holy Communion should normally follow from canon 753.

(6) The canonical conditions for incurring censure may often be lacking, but, as explained in this REVIEW, 1933, V, p. 319, it is normally presumed to have been incurred by all heretics who have reached the age of puberty. We have in the above chart considered only the censure attached to heresy, etc., in canon 2314. Other censures which the candidate may have incurred will usually be absolved in the internal forum of Penance. Cf. canon 2251. CLERGY REVIEW, 1932, IV, p. 281.

(7) The order of baptism is either "*Ordo Parvulorum*" (*Ordo Administrandi Sacramenta*, Tit. ii, cap. ii and iii) or "*De Baptismo Adultorum*" (*Rituale Romanum*, Tit. ii, cap. iii). Almost universally in this country Ordinaries permit the "*Ordo Parvulorum*" for adults from canon 755, §2.

The law about the ceremonies is in canon 760. Cf. CLERGY REVIEW, 1941, XX, p. 544. Conditional baptism without ceremonies is not only permissible for adult non-Catholics from canon 759, §2, but obligatory in this country from *I Westm.*, Dec, XVI, n. 8. It is to be done secretly and with holy water.

In all other cases of conditional baptism, i.e. all infants whether Catholics or not, and all adult Catholics, the ceremonies if formerly omitted must be supplied from canon 760; otherwise they are optional. The rite is to be performed in a church unless the Ordinary permits otherwise. Cf. canons 773, 776.

The necessity for conditional baptism of those already baptized with the Catholic rite will seldom arise.

(8) Canon 763, §1. Cum baptismus iteratur sub conditione, idem patrinus, quatenus fieri potest, adhibeatur, qui in priore baptismo forte adfuit; extra hunc casum in baptismo conditionato patrinus non est necessarius. Therefore a sponsor is not employed at the conditional baptism of children under seven whose previous doubtful baptism was administered by a non-Catholic minister with a non-Catholic sponsor.

(9) Cf. Dunne, *The Ritual Explained* (1940), p. 39, and *Ordo Administrandi Sacramenta*, Tit. iii, cap. iv, n. 6. There is no definite ruling, but it appears more in accordance with the common law to omit the "*Forma Reconciliandi Conversum*" when administering absolute baptism to an adult convert; where it is customary, as Fr. Dunne says, to employ the convert form, both the absolution from censure and the sacramental absolution are omitted. The case is different when baptizing conditionally an adult reputed heretic

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who has not reached the age of puberty; the "Forma Reconciliandi Conversum" provides a liturgical rite for the occasion and it should be employed *minus* the absolution from censure.

THE FONT WATER

May one add ordinary water repeatedly to that in the font when the latter is getting low? (E. O.)

REPLY

Canon 757, §2: Si aqua benedicta in baptisterio adeo sit imminuta, ut minus videatur sufficere, alia non benedicta admisceatur, etiam iterato, minore tamen copia.

Each time it is desired to use the font, water may be added so as to make the quantity sufficient for baptism, provided that what is added is less in quantity than that already in the font. If the latter is so low that it is impossible to obtain sufficient water except by adding a greater quantity than what is already in the font, fresh water should be blessed with the rite provided for the purpose in the *Roman Ritual*, Tit. ii, cap. viii, or in our *Ordo Administrandi*, Tit. ii, cap. vi.

It is evident that if water is repeatedly added the amount will eventually exceed the original quantity of blessed water. Most of the commentators do not advert to this difficulty; some permit two or three additions;¹ others say it may be done several times;² Dunne concludes that the addition may be repeated as often as necessary, even though the total is eventually greater than the amount of baptismal water originally in the font,³ and we think that this is correct.

ANTIPHON B.V.M.

If the whole Office of the day is recited without interruption, is it necessary to include the antiphon after Lauds as well as after Compline? (A. H.)

REPLY

Breviary rubric: In fine Laudum, vel, si post Laudes immediate subsequatur alia Hora, in fine ultimae Horae, sicuti et semper in fine Completorii . . . dicitur una e sequentibus Antiphonis finalibus beatae Mariae Virginis.

The opinion was quite common before 1923 that it was necessary, even in private recitation of the Office, to say the antiphon twice whenever the whole Office was said at one session. Cf. *L'Ami du Clergé*, 1921, p. 360:

¹ Vermeersch-Cretsen, *Epitome*, II, n. 42.

² Hébert, *Leçons de Liturgie*, I, p. 222.

³ *The Ritual Explained* (1940), p. 5.

Periodica, 1923, xii, p. 70. S.R.C., 20 April, 1923, n. 4384, decided against this view, both for private and choral recitation of the Office: "In utroque casu sufficit ut Antiphona finalis Beatae Mariae Virginis semel tantum, post Completorium, recitur."

E. J. M.

PARISH PRIEST AND "SANATIO"

In one diocese it is the opinion that a *sanatio* takes effect, i.e. the marriage is convalidated, from the date on which the document is issued from the curia. In a neighbouring diocese it is held to take effect from the moment it is communicated to the parties by the priest. What is the explanation? (L.)

REPLY

Canon 38: *Rescripta quibus gratia conceditur sine interiecto exsecutore, effectum habent a momento quo datae sunt litterae; cetera a tempore executionis.*

Canon 1138, §1: *Matrimonii in radice sanatio est eiusdem convalidatio, secumferens, praeter dispensationem vel cessationem impedimenti, dispensationem a lege de renovando consensu, et retrotractionem, per fictionem iuris, circa effectus canonicos, ad praeteritum.*

Canon 1138, §2: *Convalidatio fit a momento concessionis gratiae; retrotractio vero intelligitur facta ad matrimonii initium, nisi aliud expresse caveatur.*

This method of convalidating marriages is resorted to only for grave reasons when the invalid marriage cannot be put right in the usual way by dispensing an impediment and renewing consent. It can be granted by the Holy See alone, but Ordinaries usually possess delegated power to grant a *sanatio* in certain well-defined cases.

If the rescripts received from the curia are carefully read they will be seen to contain phrases which explain the difference which puzzles many, for the curial practice is not uniform throughout this country.

(i) A rescript granting *sanatio in forma gratiosa*, after narrating the Ordinary's power received from the Holy See, the nature of the impediment dispensed, and the *proviso* that the original marriage consent is still continuing, will contain some phrase such as: "*Ordinarius N.N. in radice sanat ac revalidat matrimonium inter N & N*" or "*Sanamus in radice matrimonium inter N & N*". The rescript will then instruct the priest to whom it is addressed to inform the parties of this fact, and usually a penance is imposed upon them, e.g. the recitation of certain prayers for a fortnight. When the Ordinary sends the rescript in this form, the *sanatio* is effected from the moment of its issue; all the preliminaries have been previously observed, e.g. the guarantees in mixed religion obtained, and the priest is merely the channel by which a notification is conveyed to the parties.

(ii) A rescript granting *sanatio in forma commissoria* entrusts or commits to the priest addressed the power to revalidate the marriage by executing

the dispensation, and it will contain some such phrase as: "Ordinarius N.N. vigore facultatum Nobis tributarum, R. Dominum parochum N.N. deputat ut matrimonium inter N & N in radice sanat dummodo . . . (various clauses or conditions to be first verified). Sent in this form, the sanatio is effected from the moment it is executed by the priest to whom it is addressed.

Thus Cappello, *De Matrimonio*, §280: "Dispensatio in forma gratiose valet a momento concessionis; in forma commissoria effectum non sortitur ante executionem. . . . Proinde si dispensatio conceditur in forma commissoria, causae verae esse debent tempore executionis; si conceditur in forma gratiose, contra, tempore concessionis scilicet eo momento quo rescriptum vel a S. Sede vel ab Ordinario conceditur."

E. J. M.

ROMAN DOCUMENTS

(i) SACRA CONGREGATIO RITUUM

LUCIONEN

CANONIZATIONIS B. LUDOVICI M. GRIGNION A MONTFORT CONF., FUNDATORIS PRESBYTERORUM MISSIONARIORUM SOCIETATIS MARIAE ET PUELLARUM SAPIENTIAE. (*A.A.S.* xxxiv, 1942, p. 44.)

SUPER DUBIO

An et de quibus miraculis post indultam eidem Beato ab Apostolica Sede venerationem constet in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.

Sanctorum Patrum traditionem colligens, mellifluus Doctor, insigne Burgundiae totiusque Ecclesiae decus: "Omnia nos Deus habere voluit per Mariam" docet, quam tenerrimam salutaremque sententiam theologi omnes modo concorditer tenent. Tenerrimam diximus et salutarem, quia Maria non solum Christi, sed omnium nostrum quoque Mater est amantissima, quae potentiam a Domino, munifico largitore in bonum hominum sibi concessam, divinas gratias superabundanter effundens, exercet. Magnificus alter tantae Matris praeco, B. Ludovicus Maria Grignon a Montfort, et ipse Galliae filius, decimo septimo et octavo saeculo, extitit, qui pariter multum de Beata Virgine saluberrime docteqque disseruit, novamque *Presbyterorum Missionariorum* religiosam familiam condidit,

quam *Societatis Mariae* nomine voluit honestare. Alterum quoque Institutum *Filiarum Sapientiae* fundavit.

Eius glorias Ludovicus Maria iugiter extulit, Maria vicissim devotum filium ad sanctitatem adduxit, atque per miracula, eo intercedente, a Deo patrata, non solum Beatificationis honores anno 1888 ei comparavit, sed et ad sollemnem Canonizationem viam sternere videtur.

Duae enim sanationes, post Beatificationem obtentae, Sacrae huius Congregationis examini delatae sunt, quae miraculo sunt tribuendae. . . .

. . . Servatis itaque de iure servandis, de utraque hac sanatione in triplici iudicii sede disceptatum est: in Anteparaeparatorio coetu coram Revmo Cardinali Raphaeli Carolo Rossi, Causae Relatore, die 23 Iulii a. 1940; in Paraeparatorio coram Revmis Cardinalibus die 1 Iulii a. 1941; demum in Generali coram SSmo D. N. Pio Papa XII, die 16 Decembris mensis anni eiusdem, in quo idem Cardinalis Relator dubium proposuit discutendum: *An et de quibus miraculis post indultam eidem Beato ab Apostolica Sede venerationem constet in casu et ad effectum de quo agitur.* Revmi Cardinales, Officiales Praelati Patresque Consultores suum edidere suffragium, quo audito, Beatissimus Pater iudicium Suum pandere, distulit, ut, ingeminatis suis adstantiumque precibus, sua mens magis magisque a Deo illustraretur. Divino itaque lumine implorato, Dominica hac, intra Octavam Epiphaniae, S. Familiae Nazarethanae cultui dicata, supremum iudicium suum edere decrevit. Quocirca subscriptum Cardinalem S. R. C. Praefectum, Revmum Cardinalem Causae Relatorem, R. P. Salvatore Natucci Fidei Promotorem generalem meque Secretarium advocavit, atque, sacratissimo Eucharistico sacrificio religiose litato, edixit: *Constare de duobus miraculis, a Deo per Beati Ludovici Mariae Grignon a Montfort intercessionem patris, videlicet: de instantanea perfecta quoque sanatione cum Sororis Gerardae a tuberculosi bilaterali pulmonari et ulcero-caseosa pelvi-peritonaeali, tum Sororis Mariae Teresiae a Visitatione, Lesage, a meningitide tuberculari.*

Hoc autem decretum promulgari et in acta S. Rituum Congregationis referri mandavit.

Datum Romae, die 11 Ianuarii, S. Familiae festo, A.D. 1942.

✠ C. Card. SALOTTI, Ep. Praenestinus, *Praefectus*.

L. ✠ S.

A. Carinci, *Secretarius*.

(ii) PONTIFICAL BIBLICAL COMMISSION

Letter addressed to their Excellencies the Archbishops and Bishops of Italy.

Rome, 20 August, 1941.¹

Your Excellency,

It is known to the Pontifical Biblical Commission that, some weeks ago, an anonymous brochure was sent to their Eminences the members of the Sacred College, to their Excellencies the Ordinaries of Italy, and

¹ Translated from the original Italian, with commentary, by V. Rev. Mgr. John M. T. Batton, D.D., L.S.S.

to some Superiors General of religious orders. It was entitled: "*A very grave danger to the Church and to souls: The system of scientific criticism in the study and interpretation of Holy Scripture, its tragic errors and aberrations*" (48 pp. in 8vo).

The brochure bears on its front the legend: "Equivalent to manuscript. Most strictly confidential." Yet, in reality, this claim is evidently contradicted by the fact that the work was despatched throughout the whole peninsula in unsealed envelopes.

Furthermore, at the foot of the last page there is the protestation: "Copy in conformity with the exhibit presented to the Holy Father, Pius XII." Since this is entirely true, no further proof is needed of the unseemliness (and your Excellency will doubtless have grasped this point from the start) of sending at one and the same time to His Holiness and to many ecclesiastics a document written with a view to being submitted for the Supreme Pontiff's examination.

These two simple facts are sufficient to prove how greatly the author of the brochure, whoever he may be, is lacking in judgement, in prudence, and in respect, and might dispense us from making any further observations. None the less, for fear that certain of the charges or insinuations may disturb some Pastors and may dissuade them from their purpose of obtaining for their future priests that sound and exact training in Holy Scripture which is so dear to the heart of the Supreme Pontiff, their Eminences the Members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, having met together in plenary session for the consideration of the matter, have decided to submit the following considerations for your Excellency's kind attention.

The brochure is intended to be a defence of a system of exegesis called the system of meditation, but it is, before all else, a virulent indictment of the scientific study of Holy Scripture. According to this author, an examination of the Bible with the help of philology, history, archaeology, etc., is nothing less than rationalism, naturalism, modernism, scepticism, atheism, and the rest. For the proper understanding of the Bible it is necessary to give free play to the human mind, as if everyone were in personal communion with divine Wisdom and received from the Holy Spirit special individual enlightenment, as was claimed by the nursing fathers of Protestantism. Hence the anonymous writer attacks with extreme violence papal personages and learned foundations; he defames the spirit of scientific Biblical studies, "an accursed spirit of pride, arrogance and superficiality, disguised by morose investigation and by hypocritical scrupulosity in regard to the letter" (p. 40); he despises learning and the study of Eastern languages and of the other subsidiary disciplines, and passes on to make serious mistakes regarding the basic principles of Catholic hermeneutics in their correspondence with the theological concept of Biblical inspiration. He misunderstands approved teaching with regard to the senses of Holy Scripture, and treats with great levity the literal sense and its accurate investigation. Finally, as though ignorant of the history of the original texts and ancient versions, as also of the nature and importance of textual criticism, he puts forward a false theory about the authenticity of the Vulgate.

Since it would be out of place, and lacking in reverence towards those

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who are pastors and masters in the Church, to rehearse elementary ideas of inspiration and Biblical hermeneutics, it may be sufficient to confront the anonymous writer's claims with some of the more recent enactments of the Holy See about the learned study of Holy Scripture, from the time of Leo XIII onwards.

(1) *On the Literal Sense.* The anonymous writer, while declaring as a matter of form that the literal sense is "the basis of Biblical interpretation" (p. 6), is in actual fact the champion of a wholly subjective and allegorical system of exegesis in conformity with personal inspiration, or rather with the more or less lively and fertile imagination of every one of us. It is, indeed, a proposition that is of faith, to be accepted as a basal principle, that Holy Scripture has, in addition to the literal sense, a spiritual or typical sense, as we are taught by the practice of our Lord and the Apostles. Yet not every sentence or narrative has a typical sense, and it was a serious error of the Alexandrian school of exegesis that it tried to find a symbolical sense everywhere, even at the sacrifice of the literal and historical sense. The spiritual or typical sense, besides being based upon the literal sense, must be proved either from its employment by our Lord, the Apostles or inspired writers, or from the traditional usage of the holy Fathers and the Church, more particularly in the sacred liturgy, since "lex orandi est lex credendi". A wider application of the sacred text may well be justified, for the purpose of edification, in sermons and ascetical works, but the resulting sense, even in the case of the most successful accommodations, may not, in default of proof after the manner stated above, be called truly and exactly the sense of the Bible, nor can it be said that it was inspired by God in the mind of the sacred writer.

By way of contrast, the anonymous author, who does not make any of these elementary distinctions, desires to inflict on us the elaborations of his own fancy as the sense of the Bible, as "truly spiritual communions of the wisdom of the Lord" (p. 45), and, misunderstanding the capital importance of the literal sense, he slanders Catholic exegetes as though they considered "only the literal sense" and considered it "after a human fashion, taking it purely materially according to the sound of the words" (p. 11); as though they were even "obsessed by the literal sense of Scripture" (p. 46). In such fashion he rejects the golden rule of the doctors of the Church, formulated so clearly by St. Thomas Aquinas: "Omnes sensus fundantur super unum, scilicet litteralem, ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum" (I, q. 1, art. 10, ad 1.) This rule was confirmed and consecrated by the Supreme Pontiffs when they ordained that, before all else, the literal sense must be established with all possible care. So, for example, Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* writes: "Propterea cum studio perpendendi quid ipsa verba valeant, quid consecutio rerum velit, quid locorum similitudo aut talia cetera, externa quoque appositae eruditionis illustratio societur" (*Enchiridion Biblicum*, n. 92), and, a little further on: "Præceptioni illi, ab Augustino sapienter propositae, religiose obsequatur [exegeta], videlicet a litterali et veluti obvio sensu minime discedendum, nisi qua cum vel ratio tenere prohibeat vel necessitas cogat dimittere" (*Ench. Bibl.*, n. 97). In like manner also Benedict XV in the Encyclical *Spiritus Paraclitus* declared: "Ipsa Scripturae verba perdiligenter consideremus, ut certo constet quidnam sacer scriptor dixerit" (*Ench. Bibl.*,

n. 498); where, when citing by way of illustration the example and exegetical principles of the "Doctor maximus in exponendis Sacris Scripturis", St. Jerome, who "litterali seu historica significatione in tuto collocat, interiores altioresque rimatur sensus, ut exquisitiore epulo spiritum pascat" (*Ench. Bibl.*, n. 499), the Holy Father recommends that exegetes "*modeste temperateque e litterali sententia ad altiora exsurgant*" (*Ench. Bibl.*, n. 499). Finally, both the Supreme Pontiffs, Leo XIII and Benedict XV, insist in the very words of St. Jerome on the duty of the exegete: "Commentatoris officium esse, non quid ipse velit sed quid sentiat ille, quem interpretatur, exponere" (*Ench. Bibl.*, nn. 91 and 500).

Comment. The existence of two principal senses in Holy Scripture, and the various distinctions needed for their accurate understanding, are so clearly taught with abundant illustrations in every manual of Catholic hermeneutics that it is hard to see how any student who had derived even a little profit from his course of scriptural introduction could make all the blunders committed by the author of the brochure in question. Students occasionally find some difficulty in distinguishing between the spiritual (or typical or mystical) sense and the multiple uses of the accommodative sense, but, as the Commission's letter indicates, the distinction is really quite simple. An excellent example of the modern use of accommodation (not to mention the numerous instances accumulated in Père Bainvel's little masterpiece, *Les contresens bibliques des prédicateurs*) is the inscription on the tomb of the unknown warrior in Westminster Abbey: "And they buried him among the kings, because he had done good, both toward God and toward His house". (AN of II Par. xxiv, 16).

(To be continued)

BOOK REVIEWS

Psychology and Religious Truth. By Thomas Hywell Hughes. Pp. 160.
(George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 7s. 6d. net.)

SEEKERS after a Christian basis which we may have in common with non-Catholics will, we fear, find little in Dr. Hughes' book to encourage their hopes. Apart from some pages on the psychology of acquired habits there is hardly a doctrinal statement in this work that a Catholic could accept. The author, who is Emeritus Principal of the Scottish Congregational College in Edinburgh, holds the fundamentally Modernist position that religion is primarily an individual experience which it is the function of creeds to interpret (p. 17). In the realm of religious truth psychology "has made it impossible for many to hold some of the old ideas in their crude and stereotyped form, for they are seen to involve features that are objectionable from a spiritual and psychic point of view". Dr. Hughes

is not unmindful of the danger that those who give up the old religious ideas may be tempted to abandon religion altogether. "There is always a peril," he writes, "in anything that tends to weaken the foundations of men's faith, and it should only be done with due caution and a sense of the seriousness of the operation." Only on two conditions, therefore, may an attempt be made to replace the old faith with a new one: (1) that the new faith is really better and more satisfying than the old which it supplants, and (2) that there is a probability of its being accepted (p. 13).

The author's attitude to religious truth is thus essentially pragmatic; and it is consequently not surprising that under his hand the Christian doctrines of Divine Revelation, Sin, Atonement, the Incarnation, the Trinity, the Future Life, assume a guise which is unfamiliar to Catholics. Space does not allow us to consider Dr. Hughes' restatement of each of these doctrines, but his view of the Atonement is so novel that it deserves to be briefly recorded. "Cannot we say that, in one sense at least, God is implicated in human sin? I dare not say that He is responsible for it. No one is responsible for sin but the man who sins. . . . We cannot and must not put the responsibility for man's sin on God. But God *is* implicated in sin for all that. . . . In so far as God gave the will and the power to choose good or evil to man, He is to that extent implicated in the use of that will in sinning. So there is objectivity in this—in what we may call the moral consciousness—or the conscience of God. And the atonement is God's effort to undo this, to rid Himself, if one may put it so, of the sense of implication in the sin of the world. . . . He found some satisfaction in it, not in the sense of receiving payment for some debt . . . but satisfaction to His own heart in doing something to rectify a wrong in which He Himself was to some extent implicated" (pp. 140-1).

G. D. S.

Religion and Life. With a preface by Dr. William Paton. Pp. 118. (P. S. King & Staples. 2s.)

It will be remembered that a Joint Statement was issued at the end of May last, the two parties to which were the "Sword of the Spirit" representing Catholics and "Religion and Life" representing all other Christians. The two movements will work, it was agreed, through joint action in the social field, and through parallel action in the religious. Therefore, in so far as the ideas and ideals of "Religion and Life" touch upon the natural law, they have for us a direct and immediate interest. This book is in no sense an official programme, but the essays and addresses do represent a cross-section of opinion in the whole movement, and may be taken, we suppose, as some indication or forecast of what such a programme might be, both in the sphere of natural law in which we are co-operating and in the sphere of religion in which we are not.

Mrs. J. A. C. Murray's contribution on *The Home*, the best of these essays in our view, contains a fertile and original idea, namely that the plight in which the world finds itself today is a reflection, hugely magnified, of the condition to which homes are being reduced. The widely voiced complaint, for example, that the modern child has no idea of the truth, is reproduced in the complaint which any person who is not half-witted

must have against the propaganda and official communiqués of all modern governments.

From the natural law it is the parents' essential duty and right to control the education of their children, an elementary truth which seems to be taken for granted in Canon Cockin's essay on *Education*. Mr. Inglis, writing on *Education and the Community*, agrees that the national system of education must be controlled, amongst other things, by the beliefs of the people themselves. But when he goes on to deny that any minority, Christian or non-Christian, should be allowed to control schools established by the community, we are tempted to ask why a minority of people in a supposed democratic country should not have their children educated according to their beliefs. Here is an imposing problem, difficult but not insoluble, which is eminently of the natural law and therefore one which is well within the terms of joint agreement and action.

The two concluding articles are by Pastor Karle and the Archbishop of Canterbury on the *Universal Church*. It is something of an achievement that neither writer has anything to say, good, bad, or indifferent, about the Catholic Church; the outlook, at least of Pastor Karle, is quite honestly and narrowly Protestant: Holy Scripture is the sole authority in the Church. Far from having any quarrel with this expression of religious conviction by a representative of "Religion and Life", we welcome it as putting beyond all dispute the fact that there is not, and cannot be, any joint action between us on the basis of credal doctrine. Our own people, in fact, may well imitate him by writing about the Christian Faith, Christian principles and Christian inheritance, in such wise that readers will unmistakably perceive that the only kind of Christian truth which a Catholic accepts is that which is taught by the Catholic Church.

E. J. M.

CORRESPONDENCE

CO-OPERATION WITH NON-CATHOLICS (CLERGY REVIEW, 1942, XX, p. 160; p. 266)

Cambrensis writes:

Both from statements made with regard to War Aims and now again from the controversy about Christian Co-operation, it seems to me that the word "Christian" is being used very loosely and vaguely.

That there is Common Ground in which "Christians" of all denominations may co-operate cannot be doubted. But that there is a Common Christian Basis for them all is hard to see. I can imagine fundamental matters, even those touching Morals, in which a Jewish Rabbi would be

able and willing to co-operate. Imagine a large Albert Hall meeting to demonstrate against Birth Control. An atheist might be willing to appear on the platform and speak against it. He could denounce it as a national evil resulting in the depopulation of the country. The Christian attitude to it and reason for denouncing it is because it is a *sin* and we could only be sure that Catholics would have that view of it. Again: Religion in the Schools. What of the Divinity of Christ? The lowest common denominator of biblical and ethical teaching that the various non-Catholic sects could agree on might be accepted even by non-Christians.

Dr. Butterfield seems very right to me.

CO-OPERATION WITH NON-CATHOLICS

(CLERGY REVIEW, 1942, XXII, pp. 79, 165, note 1, pp. 239, 335)

Canon Mahoney writes:

It seems to me that the differences between Dr. Butterworth and myself are outweighed by the great measure of agreement reached in this discussion. We are agreed that the Holy See has explicitly recommended co-operation in the vast field of social reconstruction. Dr. Butterworth, however, is disposed to see in two phrases of *Singulari Quadam* an implied papal sanction for uniting with non-Catholics in specifically religious projects. I have read this document again and am bound to say that the impression conveyed to my mind is exactly the opposite; but I have never said that the Holy See has expressly forbidden all co-operation except within the sphere of the natural law.

For we are agreed, secondly, that there is no absolute reason why it should not be extended, beyond what the Holy See has indicated, to include the promotion of Christian education, of the Christian doctrine on marriage, of the Christian religion, or of any Christian truth and practice. Catholics, however, can recognize only one kind of Christian thought in all these things, namely, that which the Catholic Church teaches. Substitute "Catholic" for "Christian" throughout the whole list of projects suggested by Dr. Butterworth and it is apparent that our co-operation with non-Catholics would have to be that of teacher, leader or guide, getting them to accept on a principle of private judgement what the Church teaches on a principle of divine authority. Co-operation on so unequal a basis is not likely to prove very attractive to non-Catholics. It is true, indeed, that a Catholic must hold what the Church teaches about the natural law, but since natural truth can be perceived by Catholic and non-Catholic alike in the light of natural reason, there is a common ground for discussion and for applying general principles to practical life.

We are finally agreed, I expect, owing to the rather novel character of the proposed co-operation, that it is very difficult to open one's mouth without putting one's foot in it, whether exploring the subject from a desk chair or from a public platform. Our only course is to follow the lead given by the Holy See and by the hierarchy. We have this in the joint letter to *The Times*, 21 December, 1940, the ten points of which are absolutely restricted to the natural law. We have it also, in so far as the "Sword of the Spirit" is sanctioned by local Ordinaries, in the Joint State-

ment published in the secular and religious press of 29 May, 1939, outlining a project of joint action which is again restricted to the social and international field. Certainly we learn to walk by walking just as we learn to think by thinking. But we must learn to walk before we can run, and we are more likely to succeed in harmonious co-operation with non-Catholics if our efforts are limited, for the time being at least, to the more obvious truths of the natural order.

ABRIDGED FUNERAL RITE

(CLERGY REVIEW, 1941, XX, p. 183; cf. 1942, XXII, pp. 226-7)

In reply to a correspondent who had pointed out an apparent discrepancy between his opinion and that of Canon Mahoney on this subject, Mr. Redmond writes:

There is really no conflict of opinion between me and Canon Mahoney. His treatment is strictly from the point of view of law and is, of course, correct; mine from that of the practical workings of an English parish.

It often happens that Catholics who are far from being exemplars decline to have a Mass of Requiem for some such inadequate reason as that the early hour is inconvenient, but, in imitation of their non-Catholic neighbours and partly for reasons of ostentation, want to have the body brought into the church on the way to the cemetery. Our Ritual makes no provision for a service to meet such cases. We have the usual liturgical observances and the brief service at the graveside. Improvised services over the coffin in the afternoon, such as some well-meaning priests devise before proceeding to the cemetery, are an irregularity which should not be encouraged. Surely a parish priest is entitled to refuse to allow a body to be brought into the church in cases of this kind when the relatives refuse to have a Requiem.

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